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DOES THE PRUDENT INVESTOR NEED THE
UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT-AN EMPIRI-
CAL STUDY OF TRUST INVESTMENT PRACTICES*
Martin D. Begleiter**
I. INTRODUCTION
The "prudent man" or "prudent person" rule governing trust investments is
one of the oldest rules in American trust law. 1 Despite undergoing modifications
over the years, 2 the fundamentals of the rule did not greatly change from its first
expression in 18303 until 1990. Since 1990, however, trust investment law has
undergone a revolution. Major criticisms of the prudent man rule in the late 1980s 4
led to the formulation and adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent
Investor Rule in 1990.5 In 1994, the Uniform Law Commissioners promulgated
the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA)6 for adoption by the states. Already a
number of states have adopted the Act.7 The significance of the change is symbol-
ized by the change from "prudent man" or "prudent person" to "prudent inves-
tor.' 8 The reformers advocated the use of the lessons of modern financial theory
in formulating trust portfolios.9 Many aspects of the law developed under the
* Copyright © 1998 by Martin D. Begleiter. All rights reserved.
** Professor of Law, Drake University Law School, B.A., 1967, University of Rochester;
J.D., 1970, Cornell University. Adviser, RESATAnMENT (THow) OF TRUSTS. The Author wishes to
thank Christine Nierenz, Drake University Law School class of 1998 and Robert Kleinknecht,
Drake University Law School class of 1999, for their valuable assistance in the research and
preparation of this article. The Author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Dean C. Peter
Goplerud, III, Interim Dean Robert C. Hunter, and Associate Dean Jerry L. Anderson of Drake
University Law School for the award of a Summer Research Stipend and for arranging for the
financing of the-survey which formed the basis of this article, both of which greatly aided the
preparation of this article. The Author is deeply grateful to J. Michael Deege, Esq., of the Iowa
Bar, Executive Director of The Iowa Trust Association, for providing the author with a list of
members of the Association, for publicizing the survey in the Association's newsletter, and for
encouraging the members of the Association to respond to the survey. Without his help, the
survey could never have been successfully completed. The Author also wishes to thank David
Swank, Vice-President of Smith Barney Inc., in Naples, Florida, for providing the author with
materials on modem investment theory and practice. All opinions are, of course, those of the
Author.
1. The rule originated in Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830).
2. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 77 IowA L.
REV. 1151, 1151-52 (1992).
3. See Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) at 461.
4. See, e.g., BEvis LONGSTRET, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN
RULE (1986); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man
Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 52 (1987).
5. See RmsATEmENT (THIRD) OF TRUSrs: PRUDENT INVEsTOR RULE (1992) (adopted at the 1990
Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute) [hereinafter REsTATEmENT].
6. Uniform Prudent Investor Act, 7B U.L.A. 56 [hereinafter UPIA] (Supp. 1995).
7. See infra Section VII.A.
8. See infra Section VII.A.
9. See sources cited supra notes 4-6.
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prudent man rule are radically changed under the prudent investor formulation. 10
Commentary is beginning to speculate on changes to investment and tax planning
under the new rule and what difficulties trustees will face under the prudent inves-
tor formulation.11
One major impetus for the change from prudent man to prudent investor was
a survey of trustee investment practices which formed the core of an extremely
influential book in 1986.12 In that book, Bevis Longstreth, a New York City attor-
ney, surveyed 200 fiduciaries, including the fifty largest bank trust departments in
the United States.13 He found that a significant number of fiduciaries believed
that trust law does not allow certain investments, such as new ventures and uncon-
ventional investment techniques. 14 Some states, in response to these criticisms of
the prudent man rule, altered their statutes governing trust investments even be-
fore the publication of the new Restatement. 15 Some of these statutes (which I
will refer to as "intermediate statutes")16 have been in effect for several years.
The prudent investor rule, in both the Restatement formulation and the Uni-
form Act, removes many of the restrictions and limitations of the prudent man
rule. As a practical matter, the crucial question concerning the prudent investor
rule would appear to be whether, if the Uniform Act (or some similar form of the
prudent investor rule) were adopted, trustees of personal trusts would formulate
trust portfolios on the basis of modem financial theory, free of any inhibitions
previously held concerning the illegality of particular investments or investment
strategies. That is, if the prudent investor rule is adopted, would trustees of per-
sonal trusts invest in accordance with modem financial and economic theory (modi-
fied by beneficiary concerns and tax situations) 17 unimpeded by the restrictive law
developed under the prudent man rule? 18
This question is extremely difficult to answer, yet it is crucial for a state legis-
lature considering adoption of the prudent investor rule. There are at present few
cases involving the new statutes which provide guidance as to trustees' investment
practices under modem statutes. 19
This Article attempts to help to answer this question. Iowa is one of the states
which passed an intermediate statute modifying the prudent man rule.20 The basic
statute, though amended twice,21 has been in operation for seven years. Corporate
trustees have had time to modify their investment practices to the change in the
statute. Thus, the practice of Iowa corporate trustees regarding personal trusts
should give some indication of whether, under a statute reflecting the prudent in-
vestor rule, trustees of personal trusts would be more likely to employ modem
10. See infra Section VI.
11. See infra Section VI.
12. See LoNGSTRm , supra note 4.
13. See id. at 5.
14. See id. at6.
15. See infra Section V.
16. See infra Section V.
17. See REsrA-EmwNT § 227, crnts. d, e, i; UPIA § 2(c).
18. See infra Section H.
19. See infra Section VH.B-C.
20. See IowA CoDE ANN. § 633.123 (West 1992) (quoted infra Part V).
21. See Act of March 23, 1992, ch. 1012, § 1, 1992 Iowa Acts 13 and Act of March 20, 1996,
ch. 1008, § 2, 1996 Iowa Acts 5. Neither amendment is relevant to the discussion in this article.
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financial and portfolio theory in developing trust portfolios than they were under
the prudent man rule.2 2 Despite the fact that Iowa's intermediate statute is not as
explicit as the Uniform Act in a number of respects, the practices of Iowa banks
under an intermediate statute should give at least some indication as to the success
of a prudent investor rule in freeing corporate trustees from the restrictions in in-
vestments under the prudent man rule.
The Author developed a survey of investment practices. 23 With the coopera-
tion of the Iowa Trust Association, the survey was mailed to 239 trust departments
in Iowa. Copies of the Iowa statute and of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act were
attached to the survey.24 The results from the survey, which form the basis of this
Article, are extremely encouraging to proponents of the prudent investor rule.25
The surveys indicate that, in regard to personal trusts, corporate trustees under the
Iowa intermediate statute do use modem financial theory to formulate trust invest-
ment portfolios, but a significant percentage of the respondents remain concerned
about liability for using new investment vehicles and techniques. 26 This result
reveals an increased use of the tenets of modem portfolio theory from the Longstreth
survey,27 indicating that passage of a prudent investor rule would be successful in
implementing the change sought by the authors of the Restatement and the Uni-
form Act: basing trust investments on the teachings of modern economic and
financial theory.
Prior to discussing the survey, it is important to describe what led to the change
from the prudent man rule to the prudent investor rule. Therefore, a short history of
the prudent man rule begins the discussion. 28 Following this discussion is a short,
and hopefully not too technical, discussion of the independent development of
modem portfolio theory.29 Next, the criticisms of the prudent man rule in the
1980s,3 0 particularly those of Bevis Longstreth and Professor Jeffrey Gordon, 3 1
will be discussed, along with the impact of modem portfolio and economic theory
on the prudent man rule.32 A discussion of the "intermediate" statutes of the late
1980s and early 1990s will follow, to set the basis for the survey.33 Then the
prudent investor rule, 34 as formulated in the Restatement and the Uniform Prudent
Investor Act, will be discussed. Lastly, the results of the survey and some conclu-
sions that can be drawn from it will be presented.
22. Some evidence of the effectiveness of a statute should be discernible from changes in
practice after seven years of experience under the statute.
23. The survey is reproduced as Appendix A to this article and the results are reported in
Appendix B. Caution should be employed in interpreting the survey results. For obvious rea-
sons, only corporate trustees were surveyed. And, although the response rate was quite good (in
excess of 25 percent), the total number of those responding to the survey (61) is small enough to
counsel caution in extending the results too far.
24. A postage prepaid envelope was enclosed to encourage participation in the survey.
25. The results are analyzed in Part VIII, infra. The statistical results are presented in Appen-
dix B, infra.
26. See infra Section VIII.
27. See LONGSTRt , supra note 4.
28. See infra Section II.
29. See infra Section III.
30. See infra Section IV.
31. See LON6STRT, supra note 4; Gordon, supra note 4.
32. See infra Section IV.
33. See infra Section V.
34. See infra Section VI.
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II. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE PRUDENT MAN RULE35
At the time of the founding of the United States, the English rule was ex-
tremely conservative, allowing investment only in securities backed by the Crown. 36
The emphasis was on ensuring the safety of the corpus at all costs; the rule was
extremely risk-averse.37 When the question first arose in the United States, how-
ever, the English rule was rejected in favor of a flexible approach. 38 In dicta, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court formulated the prudent man rule:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct himself
faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how men of pru-
dence, discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to specu-
lation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the
probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested.39
Despite the attempt of the Massachusetts court to formulate principles which
would enable trustees to be flexible in exercising their discretion,4 0 the prudent
man rule quickly rigidified into a rule allowing only safe and conservative invest-
ments.4 1 In King v. Talbot,42 the influential New York Court of Appeals rejected a
liberal interpretation of the rule by adding that the rule "necessarily excludes all
35. This is intended to be a summary only. For a more extensive discussion of the history of
the rule see LONG5MRM, supra note 4, at 50-80; see also Robert J. Aalbets and Percy S. Poon,
The New Prudent Investor Rule and The Modem Portfolio Theory: A New Direction for Fidu-
ciaries, 34 Am. Bus. L.J. 39,42-48 (1996); John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent InvestorAct
and The Future of Trust Investing, 81 IowA L. REv. 641,643-45 (1996); Gordon, supra note 4;
John H. Langbein and Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Lm, 1976 Ai.
BAR FouND. REs. J. 1, 3-6 [hereinafter Langbein & Posner]; Paul G. Haskell, The Prudent Per-
son Rulefor Trustee Investment and Modern Portfolio Theory. 69 N.C. L REv. 87,88-100 (1990);
Austin Fleming, Prudent Investments: The Varying Standards of Prudence, 12 REAL PROP., PROa.
& TR. J. 243, 243-47 (1977); Mayo Adams Shattuck, The Development of the Prudent Man Rule
for Fiduciary Investment in the United States in the Twentieth Century, 12 Onzo ST. LJ. 491,
491-504 (1951).
36. See Aalberts and Poon, supra note 35, at 42; Shattuck. supra note 35, at 492. There is
speculation that this was in reaction to the collapse of the South Sea company in 1720 (the
bursting of the South Sea Bubble). See also Langbein, supra note 35, at 643; Aalberts and Poon,
supra note 35, at 42; Langbein & Posner, supra note 35, at 3.
37. See Aalberts and Poon, supra note 35, at 42.
38. See Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446,461 (1830). Several authors think
the English rule was rejected at least partially because there were no investments available in
America comparable to securities backed by the British government. See Shattuck, supra note
35, at 493; Fleming, supra note 35, at 243.
39. Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) at 461. Some commentators believe the
rule had religious origins. See Aalberts and Poon, supra note 35. at 42; J. Alan Nelson, Note, The
Prudent Person Rule: A Shield for the Professional Trustee, 45 BAyno L Rev. 933. 937-38
(1993).
40. See LONGrsm , supra note 4, at 12; Halbach, supra note 2. at 1152; Thomas 0. Burton,
Patton G. Lochridge and David B. Young, Risk Managementfor Corporate Fiduciaries 10 (1997)
(paper for presentation by members of McGinnis. Lochridge & Kilgore, LL.P. (copy on file
with author)) [hereinafter Young]; John H. Martin, A Preface to the Prudent Investor Rule, 132
TR. & Esr. 42,42-43 (Nov. 1993).
41. Martin, supra note 40, at 42-43; Langbein & Posner, supra note 35, at 4 ("What emerged,
in short, was an emphasis on 'safe' investments, a category dominated in the minds of thejudges
and legislators by long-term fixed-return obligations such as mortgages and bonds.").
42. 40 N.Y. 76 (1869).
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speculation, all investments for an uncertain and doubtful rise in the market. ' 43 A
trustee could only be concerned with preservation of the corpus and obtaining a
reasonable income.44 The court rejected investments in common stocks, believing
that by so investing the trustees had in effect delegated the performance of the trust
to the corporate directors.4 5 In the period from 1850 through the early 1900s most
states adopted legal lists specifying permissible investments. 46
However, the legacy of King v. Talbot was more pernicious. Common stocks
were effectively held imprudent per se as investments. 47 As the case law devel-
oped, two significant limitations were developed constraining trustee investments.
First, each decided case was treated as precedent, establishing an almost univer-
sally followed rule for future cases. 48 Thus, permissible investments over time
became quite restricted. Second, broad categories of investment were prescribed
as "speculative" and therefore per se imprudent.49
This system of specified "prudent" investments blessed by legal list statutes
and court decisions saw little change until the late 1930s and early 1940s. Studies
at this time showed that returns on trust investments in "prudent man" states were
almost double the returns in legal list states.50 From the late 1930s through the
1960s, many states replaced legal list statutes with some version of the prudent
man rule.5 1 Although there were occasional criticisms of the rule or the way it was
applied, these criticisms engendered little change in the rule's operation.52
43. Id. at 86.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 88.
46. See Shattuck, supra note 35, at 499; LoNosRm-T, supra note 4, at 12; Fleming, supra note
35, at 244.
47. See LONoSTREMT, supra note 4, at 12.
48. See Halbach, supra note 2, at 1152; Martin, supra note 40, at 42-43.
49. See Halbach, supra note 2, at 1152. Even modest speculation was forbidden; each indi-
vidual investment had to be safe. See also Young, supra note 40, at 11-16. Among the invest-
ments and practices prohibited as speculative were:
1. Purchase of securities on margin.
2. Purchasing real property for resale.
3. Venture capital.
The following investments were questionable, but in most cases held speculative:
1. Precious metals
2. Collectibles
3. Deep discount bonds
4. Options
5. Futures
6. Selling securities short
7. Repurchase agreements
8. Securities lending
9. Currency hedging
10. Second mortgages.
See Robert A. Levy, Note, The Prudent Investor Rule: Theories and Evidence, 1994 GEO. MA-
SON L. REv. 1, 3. See also Martin, supra note 40, at 42-43.
50. See Aalberts and Poon, supra note 35, at 43-44; Fleming, supra note 35, at 245.
51. See LONGSTREM, supra note 4, at 12. Some of these statutes were based on a model
investment statute developed by the Trust Division of the American Bankers Association. See
Fleming, supra note 35, at 245; Shattuck, supra note 35, at 501.
52. The two most significant critiques of the rule were Shattuck, supra note 35 and Fleming,
supra note 35. Mayo Shattuck, writing in 1951, was primarily concerned with encouraging the
adoption of the flexible Massachusetts rule and having mutual funds and common trust funds
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1IH. MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY
A. Risk and Return
Entirely independent of the prudent man rule, beginning in the early 1950s,
economists and financial theorists began to develop theories regarding investing.
The early insights were formalized by Harry Markowitz in 1952.53 The first sig-
nificant point is that in designing a portfolio, an investor will look at the risk of the
portfolio and its return.54 Risk in this context is defined as the variance from the
potential or expected outcome of an investment 55 or the amount of uncertainty
involved in future outcomes. 56 But most investors are risk averse; that is, they
would prefer to reduce risk to the lowest level. 57 They prefer investments with the
smallest variance or deviation (lowest volatility in financial terms) from the ex-
pected return. 58 To say this in another way, for a given level of return chosen by an
investor, that investor will generally choose a portfolio with the lowest level of
risk (that is, the least uncertainty) possible.59 To be convinced to invest in more
volatile investments, the investor must be paid a risk premium (that is, a possibil-
ity of a greater return) to compensate the investor for the additional risk.60 Finan-
cial analysts developed a method to measure the risk of investments 61 and to com-
pare the risks of different investments to each other.
62
As investors are averse to risk, they would want to reduce risk to the greatest
extent possible. In examining risks, economists found that there were two differ-
ent types of risk-systematic, or market risk, and nonmarket (also called firm-
specific diversifiable, specific, unique, or uncompensated risk).63 Market risk is
recognized as permissible investments. See Shattuck, supra note 35, at 504-03. Fleming. writ-
ing in 1977, was disappointed that the flexible Harvard College doctrine had been rigidified by
Scott's treatise and the Restatement (Second) of Trusts and advocated flexible rules permitting
trustees to do their jobs. See Fleming, supra note 35, at 245-47. Fleming, however, was one of
the first to urge, although not as forcefully as some of the writers in the 1980, that the prudent
man rule be modified to take account of modern financial practices. See infra Section IV.B.
53. Harry J. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FiN. 77 (1952).
54. See JONATHAN R. MAcBY, AN INmoDucnoN To MonmN FNAe ctATHzoay 17 (1991). Pro-
fessor Macey's pamphlet, published by the ACTEC Foundation, is required reading for anyone
interested in understanding trust investments. It presents the basic economic and financial con-
cepts in a clear and simple way.
55. See id. at 17; see also Andrew S. Butler, Modern Portfolio Theory and the Investment
Powers of Trustees: The New Zealand Experience, 7 BoND L. Rev. 119, 122 nn.l 1-12 (1995).
56. See Stephen M. Penner, Note, International Investment and the Prudent Investor Rule:
The Trustee's Duty to Consider International Investment ehicles, 16 McH. J. INlr'L 601.623-
24 (1995).
57. See Macey, supra note 54, at 14, 16-17; Langbein & Posner, supra note 35, at 7.
58. See Macey, supra note 54, at 14.
59. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 35. at 7.
60. See Macey, supra note 54, at 16-17; Langbein & Posner, supra note 35, at 7; Penner,
supra note 56, at 626.
61. Risk is measured by variance, which is an arithmetical expression referring to the spread
of possible outcomes among various possibilities. See Macey, supra note 54, at 17, 19.
62. The standard deviation, which is the square root of the variapee, compares the risks of
different investments. See id. at 17; Butler, supra note 55. at 122 & n.12. Future variance is
predicted by past variance. See Macey, supra note 54, at 19.
63. See Jerold I. Horn, The Prudent Investor Rule-Impact on Drafting and the Administra-
tion of Trusts, 20 ACTEC Notes 26, 27 (1994).
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the risk that the return of the market in which the investment exists will be less
than predicted. 64 It is the risk common to all securities, and reflects general eco-
nomic and political conditions. 65 This risk affects all enterprises and cannot be
reduced by the investor.66 Nonmarket risk refers to the possibility that the return
of a particular asset will be less than expected. 67 Experience has also revealed that
all assets do not react to events in the same way. That is, to a given event, some
investments may go up and others may go down.68 To take a simplified example,
if there is a strike against General Motors, the chances are thit GM stock may go
down, but the stock of Ford and Chrysler and others may go up. The same analysis
works for industries. A tax on airline tickets may depress airline stocks, but cause
a rise in automobile stocks. Holding stock in Ford and Chrysler, in the first ex-
ample, and automobile stocks in the second, would help offset the losses on GM
and airline stocks, respectively.69 Thus, nonmarket risk can be diversified away.70
By diversifying her portfolio, an investor can theoretically reduce all nonmarket
risk.7 1 The only risk remaining in the portfolio would be market risk.72 There-
fore, the risk of a diversified portfolio would be lower than that of a nondiversified
portfolio. Since investors are risk averse, a rational investor would diversify her
portfolio.73 Moreover, since nonmarket risk can be diversified away, the market
will not pay an investor a risk premium for a non-diversified portfolio. 74 Clearly,
the point of diversification is to reduce firm or industry risk by investing in assets
(and markets) which move in different ways so that the risk of the entire portfolio
is reduced. 75
Applying these rules to the development of a portfolio of investments, an in-
vestor would endeavor to construct a portfolio that contained assets yielding the
lowest level of risk for a given rate of return or, alternatively, a portfolio yielding
64. See id. at 29-30; Macey, supra note 54, at 23.
65. See Langbein, supra note 35, at 647-48.
66. See Macey, supra note 54, at 21; Penner, supra note 56, at 629.
67. See Horn, supra note 63, at 29-30; Macey, supra note 54, at 21. Some authors divide
nonmarket risk into industry risk and firm risk. See Langbein, supra note 35, at 647-48. One
author notes that market risk has been estimated to comprise thirty percent of the risk of an asset,
with firm risk being twenty percent and industry risk accounting for fifty percent of total risk.
See id.
68. See Macey, supra note 54, at 20; Lewis J. Altfest, The New Prudent Investor Rule: Changing
the Rules of the Game, 4 J. TAX'N orTR. AND Esr., Winter 1992, at 18, 20.
69. See John H. Langbein and Richard H. Posner, The Revolution in Trust Investment Law, 68
A.B.A.J. 887, 888-89 (1976).
70. See id.; Macey, supra note 54, at 22; Langbein, supra note 35, at 647-48.
71. See Macey, supra note 54, at 23.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 24; Langbein & Posner, supra note 35, at 11.
74. Langbein & Posner, supra note 35, at 10; Langbein, supra note 35, at 648. Only market
risk is compensated by a higher return in the market. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 35, at
10. Market or systematic risk of a stock is measured by its beta, which measures the riskiness of
a security as compared to the risk of the entire market. See id. The higher the beta, the greater the
risk of the stock. See id.
75. One author expresses it as investing in assets which complement each other as to risk. See
Penner, supra note 56, at 628. The measure of the degree to which assets react to the market in
the same manner is called "covariance," see id., and the idea of diversification is to invest in
assets which negatively covary. See Levy, supra note 49, at 12-13.
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the highest rate of return for a given level of risk.7 6 This is the so-called "efficient
portfolio," defined as "one in which an investor would have to: (1) accept addi-
tional risk in order to obtain a higher return; and (2) give up returns in order to
reduce the riskiness of the portfolio."77 The efficient portfolio clearly must be
diversified.7 8 There are an infinite number of efficient portfolios, depending on
the investor's choice of risk or rate of return. 79 The investor selects her optimal
portfolio based on her tolerance for risk.80
The analysis of risk and return developed by financial theory significantly
focused attention on the portfolio as a whole, rather than on the individual invest-
ments in the portfolio.8 1 "The ultimate goal of modem portfolio theory is to bal-
ance portfolio risks and returns through diversification of the assets held." 82 The
reason is that lowering the risk of a portfolio is accomplished by diversifying the
entire portfolio by including in it assets which are negatively orrelated. 83 Thus
decisions as to the particular investments comprising the portfolio must be made
by considering the role each plays in the whole portfolio; such decisions cannot be
made in isolation.84
While the extent of diversification required is subject to dispute, the necessity
of diversification is not.8 5 Moreover, the focus on the risk and reaction of assets in
relation to other assets means that an asset which is highly volatile and speculative
in itself may actually reduce the risk of the total portfolio. 86 Therefore, according
to modem portfolio theory, no asset is inherently good or bad or prohibited per se
as speculative.87 The judgment of the advisability of each asset must be made in
the context of the entire portfolio. 88
76. See Macey, supra note 54, at 24.
77. Id., citing Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952).
78. See Macey, supra note 54, at 24.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 24-25.
81. See Butler, supra note 55, at 119-20.
82. See W. Brantly Phillips, Jr., Note, Chasing Down The Devil: Standards of Prudent Invest-
ment Under the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, 54 VASH. & LEs L. REv. 335,352 (1997).
83. See Butler, supra note 55, at 119-20.
84. See id.
85. If portfolio theory is taken to its logical conclusion, of course, each portfolio would
contain some of each type of investment, since markets and types of assets (e.g., venture capital,
real estate, etc.) react differently to different events. Indeed, one author has suggested that in-
cluding mutual funds investing in precious metals, foreign stocks, futures contracts and money
market investments would reduce risk by 23% under his assumptions. See Levy, supra note 49,
at 25. Another states that real estate, bonds, foreign securities, futures and options can be used
to lower risk. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 53. Most, however, concentrate on stocks. Macey
states that a well-selected 10 stock portfolio gives 88.5% of all the advantages of diversification
and 20 stocks 94.2% of the advantages. See Macey, supra note 54, at 23. Another author states
that to reach 98% diversification, ownership of 100 stocks is required. See Langbeinsupra note
35, at 648-49 & n.50. Since almost no trust owns this many stocks, pooled investment vehicles
(mutual funds or bank common trust funds) will be used. See id. See also Horn, supra note 63,
at 29-30.
86. See Michael T. Johnson, Speculating on the Efficacy of "Speculation": An Analysis of the
Prudent Person's Slipperiest Term of Art in Light of Modern Portfolio Theory, 48 STra-o L
REv. 419, 421 (1996); Gordon, supra note 4, at 62.
87. See supra note 86.
88. See Butler, supra note 55, at 122-23.
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To summarize, investors want to reduce risk as much as possible.89 Modem
financial theory has shown that this can be done by diversifying the portfolio. 90
The focus of the investor should be the portfolio as a whole, not the individual
asset. 9 1 The individual asset can be evaluated only in the context of the whole
portfolio because, though the asset may be highly speculative and volatile by it-
self, it may reduce the risk of the overall portfolio because it reacts to events differ-
ently than other assets in the portfolio.92 As put by Professor Macey:
Diversification not only reduces variability, it reduces variability a lot. What's
more, it doesn't take a lot of diversification to generate a great reduction in the
variability of a portfolio of stocks.
Diversification reduces risk for one reason: all investments do not react the same
way to all new information. Consequently, stock price movements are not uni-
form. They are imperfectly correlated. This means that if one holds a well diver-
sified portfolio, the gains in one investment will cancel out the losses in another.
Of course one cannot completely eliminate risk by holding a diversified portfo-
lio. This is because one type of risk, called systematic risk, cannot be diversified
away.93
Modem portfolio theory is the "most accepted conceptual framework for mea-
suring return and risk of assets. . ..,,94 It has been accepted by financial managers
and academics since the middle of the 1970s,9 5 but it was not accepted by trust law
until 1990.96
B. Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
In the last section, the Author argued that since investors are risk averse, they
would diversify their portfolios because to do so would reduce risk and not to do
so would increase risk without reducing return. 97 While this is intuitively true, the
finance theorists have demonstrated its truth by the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM). Although for the purposes of this Article, it is more significant that
economists have demonstrated the validity of the theory that diversification re-
duces firm specific risk, a short explanation of CAPM is warranted for a specific
relevant insight the concept offers. CAPM holds that when investment strategies
are based on risk and return, investors will diversify their portfolios to the extent
that exposes them to the minimum level of risk for a given return. 98 Assume the
beta coefficient (an economic term measuring the sensitivity of a security to mar-
ket risk) of two portfolios is exactly the same, but the risk of every security in one
portfolio (call it portfolio 1) is greater than every security in the other portfolio
89. See Macey, supra note 54,.at 14, 16-17; Langbein & Posner, supra note 35, at 7.
90. See Macey, supra note 54, at 24; Langbein & Posner, supra note 35, at 11.
91. See Butler, supra note 55, at 119-20.
92. See Johnson, supra note 86, at 421; Gordon, supra note 4, at 62.
93. Macey, supra note 54, at 20.
94. Aalberts & Poon, supra note 35, at 55.
95. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 74.
96. See infra Section VI.
97. See supra Section Il.A.
98. See Jeffrey S. Glaser, The CapitalAsset Pricing Model: Risk Valuation, Judicial Interpre-
tation, and Market Bias, 50 Bus. LAw. 687, 689-90 (1995).
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(call it portfolio 2).99 It might be assumed that investors would have a greater
return (receive greater compensation from the market) for holding portfolio I than
portfolio 2. The importance of CAPM to the present discussion is that it demon-
strates that this assumption is incorrect. Investors will not receive additional com-
pensation for holding portfolio 1.100 The reason is that the additional risk of hold-
ing portfolio 1 is all nonmarket risk, and this risk is completely eliminated by the
effects of diversification when the securities comprising portfolio 1 are chosen. 10 1
Like modem portfolio theory, CAPM is almost universally accepted by institu-
tional advisers. 1° 2
C. Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECAfH)
The previous sections have dealt with risk. The question remains, however, as
to how the assets in the portfolio are selected. The risk-return analysis and CAPM
tell us that a prudent investor will diversify the portfolio's assets to reduce nonmarket
risk and will construct portfolios of stocks which are negatively covariant so that
losses in some stocks will be offset by gains in others. 103 CAPM informs us that
the price of the securities in the portfolio will be based on their significance to the
total risk of the portfolio. 104 But should the prudent investor try to pick stocks that
she thinks are undervalued by research, or attempt to "time the market"? Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis ("ECMH") says no. The theory "states that a market is
efficient if the prices of goods sold in that marketfidlly reflects all available infor-
mation about those goods."10 5 Otherwise put, a market is efficient if all informa-
tion about the goods is reflected in the price of those goods instantaneously. If a
market is efficient, a prudent investor would not spend the time or money neces-
sary to research to find undervalued stocks because he could not beat the market
consistently over a long period of time. 106 The reason for this is that to locate
undervalued stocks, the investor must consistently discover information about com-
panies that is not generally known. 107 The ECMH says this is impossible because
by the time such information is discovered, it has already been reflected in the
price of the stock.108 Actually, there are three forms of ECMH:
1. The weak form states that information based on historic performance is
reflected in a stock's current price.109
99. Macey, supra note 54, at 25. The market risk of a securities portfolio is the average of the
risk of all the securities in the portfolio. See id. Thus, knowledge of the beta of the securities
informs an investor of the riskiness of the portfolio to general events. A beta of 1.0 means that
the stock moves exactly as the market moves. A stock with a beta of less than one means the
investment is less risky than the market as a whole. Similarly, a stock with a beta of more than
one is more risky than the market. See id. at 25-26. The example that follows is taken from
Macey, id at 31-32.
100. See id. at 32.
101. Id This is because the beta of each portfolio is assumed to be the same.
102. See id
103. See id. at 35-36.
104. See id. at 36.
105. Id. (emphasis in original).
106. See id. at 46-48.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 36.
109. See id. at 36-39.
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2. The semi-strong form states that the market price reflects all publicly avail-
able information about a stock. 11 0
3. The strong form states that a stock price reflects insider information about a
stock. 111
The efficiency of the stock market has been the subject of numerous studies.
These studies have shown that the stock market is both weak form and semi-strong
form efficient.1 12 That is, all information publicly available and all information
that can be gathered from the past values or trends of a stock is reflected in the
stock's current price. The studies have shown that the portfolios of institutional
investors have under-performed broad measures of the performance of markets as
a whole. 113 Moreover, no one fund has outperformed its market over a long period
of time. 114 Despite massive expenditures for research and trading, "professional
fund managers have been unable to 'beat the market."' 115 Professional managers
did not better the law of averages in either choosing stocks or in market timing.116
What implications does the ECMH have for investing? First, market timing
(trading based on technical analysis following stock price trends) will not work. 117
For efficient markets, a prudent investor will invest in a broad market, or index,
fund.118 However, it should be noted that the efficiency of some markets has not
been studied and some markets are likely not efficient. 119 Moreover, recent work
in financial theory has at least questioned the ECMH. 120 Thus, some degree of
active management may be called for, at least in some circumstances. 12 1
IV. CRMCISM OF THE PRUDENT MAN RULE IN THE 1970S AND 1980S
The findings in economic and financial theory detailed in Section III devel-
oped independently of the prudent man rule. Trustees did not appear to be influ-
enced by or apply these findings to trust investments. In the late 1970s and 1980s,
however, a new group of observers began to point out the relevancy of the eco-
nomic theories to trust investment practices and to call for reform in trust invest-
110. See id. at 40-41.
111. See id. at 41-42.
112. See id. at 38-41. Studies have been done for the New York Stock Exchange, the Ameri-
can Stock Exchange, and over-the-counter stocks. See id. at 37. The evidence, however, indi-
cates that the securities markets are not strong form efficient. See id. at 41.
113. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 69, at 887; Macey, supra note 54, at 38.
114. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 69, at 887.
115. Id.
116. See Langbein, supra note 35, at 655-56. Macey points out that the stock market became
efficient because of competition between market professionals (such as brokers and portfolio
managers). Since these professionals are compensated for finding and understanding informa-
tion about securities, it is in their best interests to uncover such information. The key reason
why even professionals cannot beat the market is the cost of discovering information about
stocks. See also Macey, supra note 54, at 44-46.
117. See Macey, supra note 54, at 46-48.
118. See id. at 55; Horn, supra note 63, at 30; Langbein, supra note 35, at 656-57.
119. See Macey, supra note 54, at 50-51. See also Section VI infra.
120. See Macey, supra note 54, at 56-58. The validity of the ECMH is beyond the scope of
this article. However, whether markets other than the equity markets are efficient is clearly
important in evaluating whether a trustee has performed its duty prudently. See Section VI,
infra. I hope to examine this question in more detail in a subsequent article.
121. See infra Section VI.
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ing. These criticisms, from academicians, a practicing lawyer, and a trust officer,
set the stage for the evolution from the prudent man to the prudent investor.
A. Langbein and Posner
In 1976, two young law professors, then at the University of Chicago, pub-
lished an article inaugurating a new law journal. 12 2 John Langbein1 23 and Rich-
ard Posnert 24 took on the task of discussing the impact of the developments in
financial theory on the prudent man rule. While focusing on whether index funds
were permissible trust investments, the authors reviewed the developments in fi-
nancial theory previously traced in this article. 12 5 Although the authors conclude
that index funds are permissible trust investments, 126 the major importance of the
article lies elsewhere. Perhaps its greatest significance is that it was the first at-
tempt by recognized legal scholars to bring to the attention of practicing attorneys
and law academicians the learning of economic and financial theorists. 127 Thus,
Langbein and Posner are to be given credit for beginning the integration of eco-
nomic and financial theory into the law of fiduciary investments and for being the
"founding fathers" of the impending revolution of the prudent man rule.
The article also contained other significant observations. In its focus on the
overall portfolio rather than the individual investments comprising the portfolio,
the article began the attack which would culminate in victory. 128 The article also
strongly criticized the rule prohibiting delegation by the trustee of all but ministe-
rial tasks, particularly as to choosing investments. 12 9 Langbein and Posner laid
the groundwork for a revision of this duty fifteen years later.130
B. Austin Fleming
At about the same time as the Langbein and Posner article, 13 1 Austin Fleming,
an attorney with a major Chicago bank, published an article based on his remarks
at the Annual Meeting of the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of
theAmerican BarAssociation. 132 Fleming's mission differed from that ofLangbein
122. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 35.
123. Now Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History at Yale Law School, Co-
Reporter of the Restatement (Third) of Property, Donative Transfers, and Reporter of the Uni-
form Prudent Investor Act.
124. Now Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
125. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 35, at 6-18.
126. See id. at 30.
127. In listing previous discussions of whether a trustee can invest in an index fund, the
authors cite three student notes and a book by now Judge Posner. See id. at 2 n.2. While Posner's
book EcowoMicANLYsis oF LAw is now well known, it was published only three years prior to the
article and had at that time perhaps not been widely read by practicing lawyers or law school
academicians outside of the "law and economics" school. At any rate, the article is recognized
as the initial important attempt to introduce economic and financial theory into the discussion of
trust investments. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 54 n.6.
128. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 35, at 6-7, 24-26.
129. See id. at 18-24.
130. See infra Section VI.
131. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 35.
132. See Fleming, supra note 35, at n.*. Given the date of the presentation (August 10, 1976),
I assume that the presentation was given to the Section at the 1976 American Bar Association
Annual Meeting.
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and Posner; Fleming advocated a return to the flexible Harvard College v. Amory1 33
formulation of the prudent man rule.134 Fleming believed that the original adapt-
ability of the prudent man rule as formulated and the Model Investment Statute
developed in the 1940s was constrained by the Restatement (Second) of Trusts and
Scott on Trusts.135 Fleming criticized these treatises as primarily responsible for
altering the rule from a prudent man managing his own portfolio to one managing
another's property. 13 6 This change in emphasis led courts to emphasize conserva-
tion, rule that the primary duty was to safeguard corpus, and distinguish between
speculation and investment. 137 Fleming viewed the gloss of the treatises as a
static concept, emphasizing the preservation of corpus and total risk avoidance,
which would not adapt to changing investment theory. 138 The result of these lim-
its is to "deter conscientious trustees from doing the best investment job they are
capable of ... ,,139
Fleming's article emphasized a number of other deficiencies in the prudent
man rule. The emphasis on the individual investment compels trustees to retain
losing investments well beyond when a normal investor would sell them.14 0 This
results in very conservative investments and under-diversified trust portfolios hold-
ing a few "safe" stocks. 14 1 The prudent man rule ignores any duty to preserve the
purchasing power of the principal. 14 2 The failure of the rule to allow new invest-
ment techniques results in corporate trustees ignoring will or trust provisions al-
lowing such investments for fear that despite the language of the governing instru-
ment, a court will brand the investment speculative. 143
Perhaps the greatest significance of Mr. Fleming's presentation and article is
that they brought the problem to the attention of the practicing bar. The presenta-
tion was given to a meeting of the largest organization of trust and estate attorneys,
and it was published in that organization's journal. The author was associated with
a major bank in a large city. Such a presentation alerted practicing lawyers to the
problem in a number and a way perhaps the Langbein and Posner article could not.
C. Bevis Longstreth
After Fleming's article, there were several other scholarly works criticizing
the prudent man rule.144 However, the next major step in reform came in 1986.
133. 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
134. See Fleming, supra note 35, at 255.
135. See id. at 245-46.
136. See id. at 246.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 247.
140. See id. at 248-49. A normal investor, knowing that some losses are inevitable, would sell
them based on their poor performance. A trustee, concerned about being surcharged regardless
of the overall performance of the portfolio, retains such investments hoping for a recovery. See
id. at 249.
141. See id. at 249.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 251,254-55.
144. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Hirsch, Inflation and the Law of Trusts, 18 REAL PROP., PRonArn &
TR. J. 601, 603 (1983) (stating that the rule was inappropriate in inflationary periods, since
investing for high income or to protect the purchasing power of the remainder may expose a
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Bevis Longstreth, a partner in the New York law firm of Debevoise & Plimpton.
authored a book entitled Modern Investment Management and the Prudent Man
Rule.14 5 It is, of course, not only impossible but well beyond the scope of this
article to summarize Longstreth's book. All that can be done is to make some
comments which can only begin to describe its importance.
First, the author was, and still is, a practicing lawyer and a partner at a leading
New York City law firm. The impact of criticism of the prudent man rule from
such an attorney is enormous. Second, because of the position of the author, it is
likely that the information contained in the book was more widely read than previ-
ous criticisms of the rule. Third, Longstreth combined a description of modem
financial theory146 with descriptions of the history and current status of the pru-
dent man rule 147 and criticisms of the rule. He was able to collect in one place
aspects of the rule which had previously been separately treated. Longstreth noted
the rigidity of the rule, its ignorance of modem financial theory,14 8 and the respon-
sibility of Scott's Law of Trusts and the Restatement (Second) of Trusts for much
of that rigidity. 149 In greater detail and with more certainty than any of the previ-
ous treatments, Longstreth called for major changes in the prudent man rule, which
he termed the "modem paradigm of prudence" and which he described in some
detail. 150 He also recommended that the ALI formulate a new restatement of the
prudent man rule.15 1
Perhaps of even greater significance, however, is that Longstreth provided
empirical evidence for his conclusions. He undertook to survey 200 fiduciaries,
including the fifty largest bank trust departments, on their investment practices. 152
The survey resulted in one finding of enormous importance for our purposes. It
showed that a significant number of fiduciaries, particularly corporate trustees of
personal trusts, believed that the prudent man rule prohibits or renders question-
able certain techniques in investing trust assets. 153 This finding and the details of
the survey1 54 gave great weight to Longstreth's conclusion that the rules govern-
trustee to liability); Leslie Joyner Bobo, Comment, Nontraditional Investments of Fiduciaries:
Re-Examining the Prudent Investor Rule, 33 EMoay LJ. 1067, 1093-94 (1984) (noting that in-
vestments permitted by the rule had neither kept pace with inflation nor protected the purchas-
ing power of the remainder interests, that on a total return basis, inflation has been far ahead of
traditional investments and that a conscientious fiduciary who saw his duty as protecting the
beneficiaries against inflation was forced to risk liability by investing in risky and possibly
imprudent investments).
145. LoNGsTREM supra note 4.
146. See id. Chapters 3-4, apps. A, B.
147. See id. Chapters 1-2.
148. See id. at 13.
149. See id. at 13-16.
150. See id. at 156-57.
151. See id. at 158. Longstreth terms it a "restatement of the law of fund management by
fiduciaries...." Id.
152. The survey recipients also included corporate pension funds, foundations, and private
universities. See id. at 5.
153. See id. at 6.
154. The survey also revealed a number of other significant matters. See id. at 153-54,232-
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ing trust investments and delegation needed modernization. 155 The publication of
Longstreth's book led directly to the changes described in the next two sections.
D. Jeffrey Gordon
On the heels of Longstreth's book, Professor Gordon, who collaborated with
Longstreth and wrote one of the appendices to the book, 156 published an influen-
tial article expanding on that appendix. 157 Gordon's article offered an explanation
of why the "constrained" prudent man rule retained vitality and predicted change
in the rule.158 Professor Gordon expanded on Fleming's criticism of Scott and the
Restatement, 159 explaining the importance and influence of authoritative commen-
tary on judges and the development of the common law.16 0 More importantly,
however, Gordon's article represents the most extensive attempt to reconcile mod-
em portfolio theory and the prudent man rule. Gordon partially excuses Scott for
constraining the rule on the ground that Scott lacked the theoretical framework to
distinguish between some risk, which Scott believed was acceptable, and too much
risk, which was not. 16 1 Moreover, Gordon emphasized that it was not necessary to
overrule the cases relied on by Scott to make the prudent man rule consistent with
financial theory.16 2 The cases need only be interpreted in light of the newer learn-
ing on market operation and investor behavior.16 3 Professor Gordon also offered
an explanation for the paucity of cases challenging the prudent man rule,164 and
the barriers to acceptance of the rule, including principally the complexity of the
rule and the difficulty judges could have in understanding it. 165 Lastly, Gordon
discussed in detail those portions of the rule which would require change to ac-
commodate modem portfolio theory and then discussed some of those changes. 166
155. See id. at 158.
156. See id. at ix, app. B at 195-231.
157. See Gordon, supra note 4.
158. See id. at 55-56, 113-14.
159. See Fleming, supra note 35, at 245-46. See also Section IV.B, supra.
160. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 62-64.
161. See id. at 69.
162. See id. at 67.
163. See id..
164. See id. at 75-88.
165. See id. at 90-94.
166. See id. at 94-112. Briefly, the changes suggested by Gordon are:
1. The trustee's duty of caution would require the trustee to use reasonable care, but would
permit her to employ any investment vehicle or technique reasonably expected to achieve maxi-
mum return at the appropriate level of risk. See id. at 96.
2. The anti-netting rule, prohibiting the offsetting of gains on some securities against losses
on others, would be dropped. See id. at 97.
3. Diversification would become mandatory except in special circumstances, rather than
only to reduce the risk of large losses. See id. at 97-99.
4. The rules on allocations of receipts between principal and income would require changes.
See id at 99-112.
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V. THE INTERMEDIATE STATUTES
In the period between 1986 and 1991,167 several states modified their "pru-
dent man" statutes in response to the criticisms described above. During this pe-
riod, twelve states amended their statutes, at least in part, to incorporate the les-
sons of modem financial theory into the prudent man standard. California, in
167. This period is chosen because Bevis Longstreth's book was published in 1986, see
LoiGRsmm, supra note 4, and the RESTATEENimT (THmD) oFTRuSTS (Puattmr INvEsmRo RwLa) was
adopted by the American Law Institute at its 1990 Annual Meeting and became available in
published form in 1992. See REsTATLEMNT (THrmD) oF TRusrs (PRUDE-T INVESTOR RuLE) (1992).
Statutes drafted during this period might have worked from drafts of the Restatement, but states
were not as likely to enact lengthy statutes incorporating elements of the comments into the
statute. Such statutes were enacted in 1992 or later. See, e.g., 760 Iu. CoMw. STAT. ANN., 515
(West 1992). The Illinois statute was really the first of the more elaborate statutes incorporating
aspects of the Restatement comments. Illinois worked from the "Proposed Final Draft" of the
Restatement. See Uniform Prudent Investor Act, Prefatory Note. Virginia, which amended its
statutes in 1992, is not included in the group of "intermediate" statutes, because although the
Virginia statute bears a good deal of resemblance to the statutes discussed in this section, its
changes were enacted after 1991.
The Virginia statute provides in part:
Standard of judgment and care required; authorized investments.
A. Except with respect to the securities described in § 26-40.01 and for those
investments authorized by § 26-40, in acquiring, investing, reinvesting, exchanging,
retaining, selling and managing property for the benefit of another, a fiduciary, whether
individual or corporate, shall exercise the judgment of care, skill, prudence and dili-
gence under the circumstances prevailing from time to time, (including, but not lim-
ited to, general economic conditions, anticipated tax consequences, the duties of the
fiduciary and the interests of all beneficiaries) that a prudent person familiar with
such matters and acting in his own behalf would exercise under the circumstances in
order to accomplish the purposes set forth in the controlling document. In investing
pursuant to this standard a fiduciary shall consider individual investments in the
context of the investment portfolio as a whole and as part of the fiduciary's overall
investment plan and shall have a duty to diversify investments unless, under the cir-
cumstances, it is prudent not to do so. Any determination of liability for investment
performance shall consider not only the performance of a particular investment, but
also the performance of the portfolio as a whole.
Within the limitations of the foregoing standard, a fiduciary is authorized to
acquire and retain every kind of property, real, personal or mixed, and every kind of
investment which persons of prudence, discretion and intelligence might acquire or
retain for their own account under the circumstances. Also, within the limitations of
the foregoing standard, a corporate fiduciary is authorized to retain as received its
own stock or securities or the stock or securities of a corporation owning eighty per-
cent or more of its common stock, or any stock or securities received in exchange for
any such investments.
B. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as authorizing any de-
parture from, or variation of, the express terms or limitations set forth in the control-
ling document creating or defining a fiduciary's duties and powers, but the terms
"legal investment," "authorized investment," "prudent man (or prudent investor) in-
vestment" or words of similar import, as used in any such instrument, shall be taken
to mean any investment that is permitted by the terms of subsection A ....
E. A controlling document may waive the rule of subjection A. A general autho-
rization in a controlling document authorizing a fiduciary to invest in such assets as
the fiduciary, in his sole discretion, may deem best, or other language purporting to
expand the fiduciary's investment powers, shall not be construed to waive the rule of
subsection A unless the controlling document expressly manifests an intention that it
be waived (i) by reference to the "prudent man" or "prudent investor" rule. (ii) by
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1986, was the first state to amend its statute in response to the criticisms of the
prudent man rule. The 1986 California legislation provided:
§ 16040. Standard of care; modification by trust instrument
(a) The trustees shall administer the trust with the care, skill, prudence and dili-
gence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a
like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enter-
prise of like character and with like aims to accomplish the purposes of the trust
as determined from the trust instrument.
(b) When investing, reinvesting, purchasing, acquiring, exchanging, selling, and
managing trust property, the trustee shall act with the care, skill, prudence, and
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing, including but not limited to
the general economic conditions and the anticipated needs of the trust and its
beneficiaries, that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of like character and with
like aims to accomplish the purposes of the trust as determined from the trust
instrument. In the course of administering the trust pursuant to this standard,
individual investments shall be considered as part of an overall investment strat-
egy.
(c) The settlor may expand or restrict the standards provided in subdivisions (a)
and (b) by express provisions in the trust instrument. A trustee is not liable to a
beneficiary for the trustee's good faith reliance on these express provisions. 168
The Iowa statute is perhaps more typical. Altered in 1991, the amended stat-
ute provides in part:
633.123. Model prudent person investment Act
1. Investments by fiduciaries.
When investing, reinvesting, purchasing, acquiring, exchanging, selling, and
managing property for the benefit of another, a fiduciary shall exercise the care,
skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a pru-
dent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use to
attain the purposes of the account.This standard requires that when making in-
vestment decisions, a fiduciary shall consider the role that the investment plays
within the account's portfolio of assets and may consider the general economic
conditions, the anticipated tax consequences of the investment, the anticipated
duration of the account, and the needs of all beneficiaries of the account.
The propriety of an investment decision is to be determined by what the
fiduciary knew or should have known at the time of the decision about the inher-
ent nature and expected performance of the investment, the attributes of the ac-
count portfolio, the general economy, and the needs and objectives of the benefi-
ciaries of the account as they existed at the time of the investment decision.
reference to the power of the fiduciary to make "speculative" investments, (iii) by an
express authorization to acquire or retain a specific asset or type of asset such as a
closely held business, or (iv) by other language synonymous with (i), (ii), or (iii). A
fiduciary shall not be liable to a beneficiary for the fiduciary's good faith reliance on
a waiver of the rule of subsection A.
VA. CODE § 26-45.1 (1997) (emphasis added).
168. CAL- PROB. CODE § 16040 (West 1991). California has since amended its statute to enact
the UPIA. CAL. PROB. CODE, §§ 16045-16054 (West Supp. 1998).
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2. Actions pursuant to governing instrument.
A fiduciary acting under a governing instrument is not liable to anyone whose
interests arise from the instrument for the fiduciary's good faith reliance on the
express provisions of the instrument. In the absence of an express provision to
the contrary in the governing instrument, a fiduciary shall not be deemed to have
breached the person's fiduciary duties for continuing to hold property received
into an account at the account's inception or subsequently added to the account
or acquired pursuant to proper authority if the fiduciary, in good faith and with
reasonable prudence, considers that retention is in the best interest of the trust or
estate or in furtherance of the goals of the governing instrument. 169
In fact, the legislation of nine of the other eleven states that altered their stat-
utes during this period greatly resembles the Iowa statute quoted above.
17 0 This
169. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.123 (1992) (emphasis added).
170. In addition to California, see supra text at note 168, and Iowa, see supra text at note 169,
the statutes of the remaining 8 states provide:
Alabama
§ 19-3-120.2. Standard of care--Considerations by fiduciary.
(a) When investing, reinvesting, purchasing, acquiring, exchanging, selling and
managing property for the benefit of another, a trustee, executor, administrator, guard-
ian, conservator or other fiduciary shall act with the care, skill, prudence and dili-
gence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use to attain the purposes of the ac-
count. In making investment decisions, a fiduciary shall consider the role that the
investment plays within the account's overall portfolio of assets and may consider the
general economic conditions, the anticipated tax consequences of the investment, the
anticipated duration of the account and the needs of the beneficiaries of the account.
(b) The propriety of an investment decision is to be determined by what a fidu-
ciary knew or should have known at the time of the decision about the inherent nature
and expected performance of the investment, the attributes of the account portfolio,
the general economy, and the needs and objectives of the beneficiaries of the account
as they existed at the time of the investment decision.
(c) Any fiduciary acting under a governing instrument shall not be liable to
anyone whose interests arise from such instrument for the fiduciary's good faith reli-
ance on the express provisions of such instrument. The standards set forth in this
section may be expanded, restricted or eliminated by express provisions in a govern-
ing instrument.
(d) In the absence of an express provision to the contrary in a governing instrument,
a fiduciary may without liability continue to hold property received into an account at
its inception or subsequently added to it or acquired pursuant to proper authority if
and as long as the fiduciary, in the exercise of good faith and of reasonable prudence,
may consider that retention to be in the best interest of the account or in furtherance of
the goals of the governing instrument. Such property may include, among other things,
stock in the fiduciary if a corporation, and stock in any corporation controlling, con-
trolled by or under common control with the fiduciary.
ALA. CoDE § 19-3-120.2 (1996) (enacted in 1989).
Delaware
§ 3302. Degree of care; authorized investments.
(a) When investing, reinvesting, purchasing, acquiring, exchanging, retaining,
selling and managing property for the benefit of another, a fiduciary shall act with the
care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that apru-
dent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use to
attain the purposes of the account. In making investment decisions, a fiduciary may
consider the general economic conditions, the anticipated tax consequences of the
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investment and the anticipated duration of the account and the needs of its beneficia-
ries.
(b) Within the limitations of the foregoing standard and considering individual
investments as part of an overall investment strategy, a fiduciary is authorized to ac-
quire every kind of property, real, personal or mixed, and every kind of investment,
wherever located, whether within or without the United States, including, but not by
way of limitation, bonds, debentures and other corporate obligations, stocks, pre-
ferred or common, shares or interests in common funds or common trust funds, secu-
rities of any open-end or closed-end management type investment company or invest-
ment trust registered under the Federal Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C.
§ 80A-1 et seq.), options, futures, warrants, limited partnership interests and life in-
surance. No investment made by a fiduciary shall be deemed imprudent solely be-
cause the investment is not specifically mentioned in this subsection.
(c) The propriety of an investment decision is to be determined by what the
fiduciary knew or should have known at the time of the decision aliout the inherent
nature and expected performance of the investment, the attributes of the portfolio, the
general economy, and the needs and objectives of the beneficiaries of the account as
they existed at the time of the decision. Any determination of liability for investment
performance shall consider not only the performance of a particular investment, but
also the performance of the portfolio as a whole.
(d) Any fiduciary acting under a governing instrument shall not be liable to
anyone whose interests arise from that instrument for the fiduciary's good faith reli-
ance on the express provisions of such instrument. The standards set forth in this
section may be expanded, restricted or eliminated by express provisions in a govern-
ing instrument.
12 DE.. CODE ANN. § 3302 (1995) (enacted in 1986).
Georgia
Investments by executors and trustees-Standard for handling property; authorized
acquisitions and investments; retention of property; conversion of nonproductive prop-
erty qualifying for marital deduction into productive property.
(a) As used in this Code section, the terms "property" and "investment" shall be
deemed to include life insurance, endowment, and annuity contracts issued by any
insurer authorized to do business in this state.
(b) In acquiring, investing, reinvesting, exchanging, retaining, selling, and man-
aging property for the benefit of another, an executor or trustee shall exercise the
judgment and care, under the circumstances then prevailing, that a prudent person
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use to attain the pur-
poses of the account. In making investment decisions, an executor or trustee may
consider the general economic conditions, the anticipated tax consequences of the
investment, the anticipated duration of the account, and the needs of its beneficiaries.
(c) Within the limitations of the standard provided in subsection (b) of this Code
section and considering individual investments as part of an overall investment strat-
egy, an executor or trustee is authorized to acquire and retain every kind of property
(real, personal, or mixed) and every kind of investment, specifically including, but
not by way of limitation, bonds, debentures, and other corporate obligations, and stocks,
preferred or common, including the securities of or other interests in any open-end or
closed-end management investment company or investment trust registered under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, as from time to time amended. The propriety of an
investment decision is to be determined by what the executor or trustee knew or should
have known at the time of the decision about the inherent nature and expected perfor-
mance of the investment (including probable yield), the attributes of the portfolio, the
general economy, and the needs and objectives of the beneficiaries of the account as
they existed at the time of the decision. Any determination of liability for investment
performance shall consider not only the performance of a particular investment, but
also the performance of the individual's portfolio as a whole. Within the limitations of
such standard, an executor or trustee may retain property properly acquired, without
limitation as to time and without regard to its suitability for original purchase.
GA. CODE ANN. § 53-8-2 (1997) (enacted in 1988).
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Montana
72-34-114. Duty to use ordinary skill and prudence.
(1) The trustee shall administer the trust with the care, skill, prudence, and
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person would use to
accomplish the purposes of the trust as determined from the trust instrument.
(2) When investing, reinvesting, purchasing, acquiring, exchanging, selling, and
managing trust property, the trustee shall act with the care, skill, prudence, and dili-
gence under the circumstances then prevailing, including but not limited to the gen-
eral economic conditions and the anticipated needs of the trust and its beneficiaries,
that a prudent person would use to accomplish the purposes of the trust as determined
from the trust instrument. In the course of administering the trust pursuant to this
standard, individual investments shall be considered as part of an overall investment
strategy.
(3) The trustor may expand or restrict the standards provided in subsections (1)
and (2) by express provisions in the trust instrument. A trustee is not liable to a benefi-
ciary for the trustee's reliance on these express provisions.
MoNT. CODE ANN. § 72-34-114 (1997) (enacted in 1989).
Nevada
164.050. Standard of care in investing and managing property.
1. In acquiring, investing, reinvesting, exchanging, retaining, selling and man-
aging property for the benefit of another, a fiduciary shall exercise the judgment and
care under the circumstances then prevailing, which men of prudence, discretion and
intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs, not in regard to specula-
tion, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their money, considering the prob-
able income as well as the probable safety of their capital. Within the limitations of
the foregoing standard, and subject to any express provision or limitation contained
in any particular trust instrument or will, a fiduciary is authorized to acquire and
retain every kind of property, real, personal or mixed, and every kind of investment,
specifically including, but not by way of limitation, bonds, debentures, and other cor-
porate obligations, and stocks, preferred or common, which men of prudence. discre-
tion and intelligence acquire or retain for their own account.
2. The propriety of an investment decision is to be determined by what the
fiduciary knew or should have known at the time of the decision about the inherent
nature and expected performance of the investment, the attributes of the portfolio, the
general economy and the needs and objectives of the beneficiaries of the account as
they existed at the time of the decision. Any determination of the liability of the fidu-
ciary for the performance of his investments must be made giving consideration not
only to the performance of a particular investment, but also to the performance of the
portfolio as a whole.
3. Nothing contained in this section authorizes any departure from, or variation
of, the express terms or limitations set forth in any will, agreement, court order or
other instrument creating or defining the fiduciary's duties and powers, but the terms
"legal investment," or "authorized investment" or words of similar import, as used in
any such instrument, shall be taken to mean any investment which is permitted by the
terms of subsection 1.
4. The provisions of this section govern fiduciaries acting under wills, agree-
ments, court orders and other instruments now existing or hereafter made.
NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 164.050 (Michie 1993) (effective 1989).
South Carolina
§ 62-7-302. Trustee's standard of care.
(a) Except as otherwise provided by the terms or limitations set forth in any
will, agreement, court order, or other instrument creating or defining the fiduciary's
duties and powers (the terms "legal investment" or "authorized investment" or words
of similar import, as used in any such instrument being taken, however, to mean any
investment which is permitted by the terms of this section), in acquiring, investing,
reinvesting, exchanging, retaining, selling, and managing property for the benefit of
another, a fiduciary shall exercise the judgment and care under the circumstances
then prevailing, that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
1999]
matters would use to attain the purposes of the fiduciary account. In making invest-
ment decisions, a fiduciary may consider the general economic conditions, the antici-
pated tax consequences of the investment, the anticipated duration of the fiduciary
account, the needs and objectives of its beneficiaries, and other prevailing circum-
stances. Within the limitations of the foregoing standard and considering individual
investments as part of an overall investment strategy, a fiduciary is authorized to:
(I) acquire and retain every kind of property and every kind of investment, spe-
cifically including, but not by way of limitation, bonds, debentures, and other corpo-
rate obligations, and stocks, preferred or common, and securities of any open-end or
closed-end management-type investment company or investment trust registered un-
der the Federal Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended;
(2) retain property properly acquired, without limitation as to time and without
regard to its suitability for original purchase;
(3) retain the property received by such fiduciary on the creation of the estate,
guardianship, trust, or other fiduciary account (including, in the case of a corporate
fiduciary, stock or other securities of its own issue or of its parent corporation's issue)
without regard to its suitability for original purchase;
(4) retain the securities into which corporate securities owned by the fiduciary
may be converted or which may be derived therefrom as a result of merger, consolida-
tion, stock dividends, splits, liquidations, and similar procedures (and may exercise
by purchase or otherwise any rights, warrants, or conversion features attaching to any
such securities);
(5) purchase or otherwise acquire and retain any security underwritten by a syn-
dicate, even if the fiduciary or its affiliate (defined as any entity which owns or is
owned by, in whole or in part, the fiduciary or is owned by the same entity that owns
the fiduciary) participates or has participated as a member of the syndicate, provided
the fiduciary does not purchase the security from itself, its affiliate, or from another
member of the underwriting syndicate or its affiliate pursuant to an implied or express
reciprocal agreement between the fiduciary or its affiliate, and such other member or
its affiliate, to purchase all or part of each other's underwriting participation commit-
ment within the syndicate. The propriety of an investment decision is to be deter-
mined by what the fiduciary knew or should have known at the time of the decision
about the inherent nature and expected performance of the investment, the attributes
of the portfolio, the general economic conditions, the anticipated tax consequences of
the investment, the anticipated duration of the fiduciary account, the needs and objec-
tives of the beneficiaries of the account, and other pertinent circumstances as they
existed at the time of the decision. Any determination of liability for investment per-
formance shall consider not only the performance of a particular investment but also
the performance of the portfolio as a whole. Any fiduciary acting under a governing
instrument shall not be liable to anyone whose interests arise from that instrument for
the fiduciary's good faith reliance on the express provisions of such instrument. The
standards set forth in this section may be expanded, restricted, or eliminated by ex-
press provisions in a governing instrument; and
(6) invest and reinvest in the securities of an open-end or closed-end manage-
ment investment company or of an investment trust registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, as amended. A bank or trust company may invest in these
securities even if the bank or trust company, or an affiliate of the bank or trust com-
pany, provides services to the investment company or investment trust such as that of
an investment advisor, custodian, transfer agent, registrar, sponsor, distributor, man-
ager, or otherwise, and receives reasonable remuneration for those services.
(b) The provisions of this section shall not be construed as restricting the power
of a court of proper jurisdiction to permit a fiduciary to deviate from the terms of any
will, agreement, or other instrument relating to the acquisition, investment, reinvest-
ment, exchange, retention, sale, or management of fiduciary property.
S.C. CODE AN. § 62-7-302 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1997) (enacted in 1990).
Tennessee
35-3-117. Additional methods of investment under prudent man rule.
(a) All trustees, guardians and other fiduciaries in this state (herein collectively
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called "fiduciary"), unless prohibited by the will, deed, agency agreement or trust
instrument (herein collectively called "governing instrunent") of the person (herein
collectively called "trustor") creating the trust, agency account or other fiduciary re-
lationship, or unless by any such governing instrument another mode of investment is
prescribed, may, in addition to other methods of investment authorized by law, invest
all funds held in the trust or agency account or for investment as provided in this
section.
(b) When investing, reinvesting, purchasing, acquiring, exchanging, selling and
managing property, a fiduciary shall act not in regard to speculation but with the care,
skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing, specifically
including, but not by way of limitation, the general economic conditions, the antici-
pated tax consequences of an investment, the anticipated duration of the trust, and the
anticipated needs of the trust and its beneficiaries, that a prudent person acting in a
like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise
of like character and with like aims to attain the goals of the trustor as determined
from the governing instrument. Within the foregoing limitations and considering in-
dividual investments as part of an overall investment strategy, a fiduciary is autho-
rized to acquire and retain every kind of property (real, personal or mixed, and includ-
ing life insurance, endowment and annuity contracts) and every kind of investment.
The trustor may expand or restrict the standards set forth in this section by express
provisions in the governing instrument. Any fiduciary under a governing instrument
shall not be liable to anyone whose interests arise from that instrument for the
fiduciary's good faith reliance on those express provisions. Any determination of li-
ability for investment performance shall consider the performance of the portfolio as
a whole and shall not be confined to the performance of a particular investment.
(c) In the absence of express provisions to the contrary in the governing instru-
ment, a fiduciary may without liability continue to hold property received into a trust
at its inception or subsequently added to it or acquired pursuant to proper authority if
and as long as the fiduciary, in the exercise of good faith and reasonable prudence,
discretion and intelligence, may consider that retention is in the best interest of the
trust and its beneficiaries or in furtherance of the goals of the trustor as determined
from that instrument. Such property may include capital stock in the corporate fidu-
ciary and stock in any corporation controlling, controlled by or under common con-
trol with such fiduciary....
TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-3-117 (1996) (enacted in 1989).
Texas
§ 113.056. Standard for Trust Management and Investment.
(a) Unless the terms of the trust instrument provide otherwise, in acquiring,
investing, reinvesting, exchanging, retaining, selling, supervising, and managing trust
property, including an investment vehicle authorized for the collective investment of
trust funds pursuant to Part 9, Title 12, of the Code of Federal Regulations, a trustee
shall exercise the judgment and care under the circumstances then prevailing that
persons of ordinary prudence, discretion, and intelligence exercise in the manage-
ment of their own affairs, not in regard to speculation but in regard to the permanent
disposition of their funds, considering the probable income from as well as the prob-
able increase in value and the safety of their capital. In determining whether a trustee
has exercised prudence with respect to an investment decision, such determination
shall be made taking into consideration the investment of all the assets of the trust, or
the assets of the collective investment vehicle, as the case may be, over which the
trustee had management and control, rather than a consideration as to the prudence of
the single investment of the trust, or the single investment of the collective invest-
ment vehicle, as the case may be.
(b) Within the limitations of Subsection (a) of this section, a trustee may acquire
and retain every kind of property and every kind of investment that persons of ordi-
nary prudence, discretion, and intelligence acquire or retain for their own account.
(c) Within the limitations of Subsection (a) of this section, a trustee may indefi-
nitely retain property acquired under this section without regard to its suitability for
original purchase.
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type of statute expanded the traditional prudent man rule in four ways:
1. It made clear that the propriety of any individual investment was to be
judged by the investment's relation to the portfolio as a whole. 17 1
2. It made explicit that in designing the portfolio, the fiduciary could take
account of factors such as economic conditions, the needs of the beneficiaries, the
expected length of the trust, and the tax aspects of the investment. 172
3. It recognized that the governing instrument could authorize or permit in-
vestments beyond the stated standard. 17 3
4. A decision as to prudence would be based on the fiduciary's knowledge (or
what the fiduciary should have known) at the time the decision was made. 174
Two states took a slightly more expansive approach. In 1986, Minnesota
adopted a statute which, although having many similarities to the statutes cited
above, contained some significant differences. This statute lists additional factors
to be used in considering prudence and appears to attempt to authorize a broader
range of investments and techniques than previously allowed under the traditional
prudent man rule. 175
(d) Within the limitations of Subsection (a) of this section, whenever the instru-
ment directs, requires, authorizes, or permits investment in obligations of the United
States government, the trustee may invest in and hold such obligations either directly
or in the form of interests in an open-end management type investment company or
investment trust registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
80a-I et seq., or in an investment vehicle authorized for the collective investment of
trust funds pursuant to Part 9, Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations, so long as
the portfolio of such investment company, investment trust, or collective investment
vehicle is limited to such obligations and to repurchase agreements fully collateral-
ized by such obligations.
TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 113.056 (West 1995) (enacted in 1991).
171. See statutes supra at notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See MtrN. STAT. ANN. § 501.125 (West 1996) (repealed 1989) (quoted in REsTATEMBNT
(THRD) OF TRusTs, PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227, Reporter's General Notes at 74-75 (Proposed
Final Draft 1990)), which provided:
(a) A trustee is authorized to invest in every kind of real or personal property and
every kind of investment, specifically including, but not by way of limitation, bonds,
debentures and other individual or corporate obligations, mutual funds, and corporate
stocks that a prudent person would invest in having in mind the preservation of the
trust estate and the amount and regularity of the income derived. In considering an
investment, a trustee shall exercise the care, skill, and judgment under the circum-
stances then prevailing that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in the man-
agement of the person's own property; and shall consider the role that the investment
plays within the trust's overall portfolio of assets. If the trustee has greater skills than
a person of ordinary prudence or is named trustee by representing that the trustee has
greater skills than a person of ordinary prudence, the trustee is under a duty to use
those skills.
(b) Among the factors to be considered by a trustee in determining the prudence of a
particular investment are the following:
(1) the probable income of the trust as well as the probable safety of the capital
of the trust;
(2) the composition of the portfolio of the trust with regard to diversification;
(3) the length of the term of investments of the trust;
(4) the duration of the trust;
(5) the liquidity needs and current return of the trust's portfolio relative to the
anticipated cash requirements of the trust;
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A series of statutes enacted by the state of Washington in 1984 adopted a
"total asset" (portfolio) approach, listed seven factors that a fiduciary should con-
sider in applying that approach, and authorized nontraditional investments, includ-
ing, for example, new and unproven enterprises (including investing as a limited
partner), with a limit of ten percent of the trusL 176
(7) the relative interests of income and remainder beneficiaries; and
(8) the tax consequences.
(c) If a trustee is a national banking association or holds a certificate under
section 48.37 or if a trustee retains or employs an investment advisor registered under
the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, an investment which is otherwise prudent is not
imprudent solely because it is in new, unproven, untried or other enterprises with a
potential for a significant growth or in a limited partnership or commingled fund
investing in these enterprises.
Minnesota has since enacted the UPIA. MwNo. STAT. ANN. § 501B.151 (1997).
176. See WASH. Ruv. CODE AN. §§ 11.100.020, 11.100.023 (West 1996), which provide as
follows:
§ 11.100.020. Management of Trust Assets by Fiduciary.
(1) A fiduciary is authorized to acquire and retain every kind of property. In
acquiring, investing, reinvesting, exchanging, selling and managing property for the
benefit of another, a fiduciary, in determining the prudence of aparticular investment,
shall give due consideration to the role that the proposed investment or investment
course of action plays within the overall portfolio of assets. In applying such total
asset management approach, a fiduciary shall exercise the judgment and care under
the circumstances then prevailing, which persons of prudence, discretion and intelli-
gence exercise in the management of their own affairs, not in regard to speculation
but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, and if the fiduciary has
special skills or is named trustee on the basis of representations of special skills or
expertise, the fiduciary is under a duty to use those skills.
(2) Except as may be provided to the contrary in the instrument, the following
are among the factors that should be considered by a fiduciary in applying this total
asset management approach:
(a) The probable income as well as the probable safety of their capital;
(b) Marketability of investments;
(c) General economic conditions;
(d) Length of the term of the investments;
(e) Duration of the trust;
(f) Liquidity needs;
(g) Requirements of the beneficiary or beneficiaries;
(h) Other assets of the beneficiary or beneficiaries, including earning ca-
pacity; and
(i) Effect of investments in increasing or diminishing liability for taxes.
(3) Within the limitations of the foregoing standard, and subject to any express
provisions or limitations contained in any particular trust instrument, a fiduciary is
authorized to acquire and retain every kind of property, real, personal, or mixed, and
every kind of investment specifically including but not by way of limitation, deben-
tures and other corporate obligations, and stocks, preferred or common, which per-
sons of prudence, discretion, and intelligence acquire for their own account.
§ 11.100.023. Authority of Fiduciary to Invest in Certain Enterprises.
Subject to the standards of RCW 11.100.020, a fiduciary is authorized to invest
in new, unproven, untried, or other enterprises with a potential for significant growth
whether producing a current return, either by investing directly therein or by invest-
ing as a limited partner or otherwise in one or more commingled funds which in turn
invest primarily in such enterprise*. The aggregate amount of investments held by a
fiduciary under the authority of this section valued at cost shall not exceed ten percent
of the net fair market value of the trust corpus, including investments made under the
authority of this section valued at fair market value, immediately after any such in-
vestment is made. Any investment which would have been authorized by this section
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We would be in a better position to analyze whether the courts would employ
these "intermediate statutes" to import modem portfolio theory into the evaluation
of trust investment decisions if these statutes had produced a body of case law
indicating how they would be interpreted. Unfortunately, to date only a single case
has involved a significant interpretation of these statutes. Estate of Cooper177 was
an estate accounting proceeding challenging the investments of a co-executor and
co-trustee (who was also the income beneficiary) over a period of eleven years. 17 8
Decedent bequeathed one-half of her community property in trust with the income
from the trust payable to her husband for his life, and on his death the trust prop-
erty became payable to decedent's two children. 17 9 Following the sale of the
community's share of a closely held corporation at a one-million dollar profit, 18 0
the estate was invested thirteen percent in common stocks and eighty-seven per-
cent in bonds and bond equivalents. 18 1 In addition, the estate inventory listed an
unsecured note of $1.2 million and interests in two partnerships. 182 The court
evaluated the propriety of the investments as if they were held by a trust. 183
The court viewed the question of whether the fact that the return of the trust as
a whole exceeded the co-trustee bank's Trust Department returns exonerated the
trustees, or whether the court could consider the performance of specific assets in
determining trustee liability. 184 The court ruled that it could consider specific
assets and groups of assets, correctly ruling that the performance of the trust as a
whole is not measured by the overall net gain or loss of the trust. 185
Although the court reached the correct result, its reasoning was flawed. The
court apparently did not understand the total portfolio concept of the statute. An
evaluation of the total portfolio would have analyzed whether the executors and
trustees formulated a rational plan for the investment of the estate and trust, evalu-
ating the role of each investment in the overall corporation of the portfolio. There
is no indication that the court undertook this sort of evaluation. 18 6 The question is
not whether specific assets or groups of assets could be scrutinized. The relevant
question is whether the trustee formulated a plan for the trust, evaluating risk and
return, and chose the trust investments with a view as to their role in the overall
177. 913 P.2d 393 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
178. See id. at 393-96. The decedent died in 1978, but no inventory and accounting of the
estate assets was filed until 1989.
179. See id. at 395.
180. See id. at 396.
181. See id. at 397.
182. See id. at 396.
183. See id. at 397.
184. See id. at 395.
185. See id. at 398.
186. There is one subtle hint that perhaps the court had an inkling of what it should be doing.
The court stated:
Likewise, Mr. Cooper did not weigh his investment in income-producing securities
against his investment in [the closely held corporation]. The overall trust perfor-
mance was boosted dramatically by the sale of the [closely held] stock in 1983. But
Mr. Cooper's investment strategy could not have anticipated the gain from the sale of
the stock before it occurred.
Id. at 399.
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portfolio. 187 There is no indication that the court understood that its role was to
determine if the trustees performed this kind of analysis. 
188
In addition to deciding the case on the trustee's failure to formulate a rational
investment plan, the court could have decided the case on the ground that the hus-
band, as trustee and income beneficiary, had a conflict of interest. By investing in
assets weighted toward producing income, the trustee violated the duty of impar-
tiality between the income beneficiary and remaindermen. 189 While the duty of
impartiality is influenced by modem portfolio theory,19 0 there is no indication that
this case represents the balancing of interests called for by the Restatement.19 1
Moreover, the conflict of interest in this case makes the trustee's conduct wrongful
on grounds entirely independent of the propriety of the investments.
The only other case to discuss the intermediate statutes does not significantly
aid in their interpretation because it involved a trust instrument containing special
-provisions which controlled the question at issue.192 For our purposes, the court
noted that while the Minnesota statute required that diversification be considered
with regard to the initial making of an investment, the sale or disposition of invest-
ments is in the trustee's discretion. 193 While this may indicate a strict interpreta-
tion of the statute, the importance of the statement is unclear. The import of the
court's observation is unclear, first, because it is dictum (since the special provi-
sion in the instrument controlled the investments in this case); and second, because
the court devotes only three sentences in its opinion to the issue.
VI. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS AND THE UNIFORM PRUDENT
INVESTOR ACr-MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY ADOPTED
A. Introduction
The traditional prudent man rule prohibited trustees from investing trust funds
in accordance with modem portfolio theory. Trustees were prevented from pursu-
ing promising investment opportunities 194 and using newer investment tools such
187. See supra at Section I.
188. The court did recognize that the prudent investor test was one of conduct and that the
performance of the trust, while a factor, is not controlling. See Estate of Cooper, 913 P.2d at 398.
189. See RmSATEmNr (SEcoND) TRusTs § 232. This duty, like the other aspects of trust invest-
ing, applies not to each individual investment, but to the trust portfolio as a whole. See RasTAE-
Nr=, supra note 5 § 227 cmt. i, § 232 cmt. c. The court noted the overweighting of the invest-
ments towards income and recognized the conflict of interest the husband faced between his
duty as trustee and his position as income beneficiary. See Estate of Cooper, 913 P.2d at 399.
190. See REsTATamNT, supra note 5, § 232, cmt. C.
191. See id.
192. In the Matter of Trusts Created by Hormel, 504 N.V.2d 505 (Minn. App. 1993). The
trust instruments involved provided that the trusts and the grantor's foundation maintain a con-
trolling interest in Geo. A. Hormel & Co. See id. at 507. The main issue in the case was whether
the trustees should be surcharged for failure to sufficiently diversify the assets of the trusts. See
id at 508-09.
193. See id. at 512.
194. See Diane Del Guercio, The Distorting Effect of the Prudent-Man Laws on Institutional
Equity Investment, 40 J. FiN. Eco. 31, 35 (1996).
1999]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
as futures and options. 195 This caused trustees to tilt trust accounts toward high
quality stocks. 19 6 Thus, the performance of trust funds tended to mirror the per-
formance of large capitalization companies. 197 Mutual funds outperformed bank
funds from 1968 to 1983, while the reverse was true from 1983 to 1989.198 The
significant point is that the fear of liability under the old prudent man rule distorted
trustees' investment decisions and did not permit trustees to invest in accordance
with modem economic theory.
Summarizing the deficiencies of the common law prudent man rule, the rule:
1. focused on individual assets rather than on the overall portfolio;
2. focused on the preservation of the nominal value of the corpus rather than
on maintenance of its purchasing power;
3. completely prohibited certain investments and classes of investments;
4. prohibited delegation of all but ministerial duties;
5. encouraged the avoidance of acquiring new investment products and em-
ploying new investment techniques; and
6. approved certain investments without inquiry. 199
The intended flexibility of the prudent man rule as first enunciated rigidified
with subsequent elaboration by the courts.2 0 1 The investment rules became rigid
and frozen.2 00 Such arbitrary restrictions cause unjustified liability for trustees
and conservatism in adopting new and promising products and techniques. The
restrictions were unwise and "often counterproductive. '2 02 While there were iso-
lated reports of trust departments at certain banks using modem portfolio theory,203
such instances were few. It was said that courts were unable to comprehend the
teachings of modem portfolio theory.2 04
195. See id. (reporting a 1988 study by Stanley Block & Timothy Gallagher, How Much Do
Bank Trust Departments Use Derivatives?, 15 J. PORTFOLIO MGmT. Fall 1988 at §§ 12-15, show-
ing only 11.3 percent of bank trust managers used futures and options for trust funds, with 95 of
204 managers responding citing legal obstacles to explain the failure to use these vehicles).
196. See id. at 32, 58-59. High quality stocks tend to be those of companies with larger
capitalization and low book-to-market ratios. See id. at 60.
197. See id. at 58-59.
198. See id.
199. See Horn, supra note 63, at 27. See also Aalberts and Poon, supra note 35, at 53; Johnson,
supra note 86, at 420-21; Young, supra note 40, at 11; Richard A. Sages, The Prudent Investor
Rule and the Duty Not to Delegate, TR. & EST. May, 1995, at 22.
200. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 5, Introduction.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. It was reported in 1990 that, at least for trust accounts of individual investors, United
States Trust Company of New York was using modern portfolio theory, including focusing on
total return, index funds, international investments, and a long-term perspective. Frederick B.
Taylor, Overcoming the Short-Term Short-SightedApproach, TR. & EST., March 1990, at 16-17.
It was also reported that the Worthen Bank and Trust Company in Little Rock invested in no load
mutual funds (in place of common trust funds) for trusts, allocating these funds based on the
clients' return objectives and risk tolerances, subscribed to services rather than using analysts,
established asset allocation models and a computer program for purchases and sales, and evalu-
ated investment companies and mutual funds instead of individual stocks. See Aubrey L. Avants,
Investing the Multi-Manager Multi-Style Way, TR. & Esr., March 1990, at 20,21-24.
204. See Young, supra note 40, at 10.
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The American Law Institute investigated the topic of trust investments and, in
1990, reformulated the prudent man rule.205 The Institute reformulated the pru-
dent man rule as the prudent investor rule in the new Restatement.20 6 The Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law in 1994 reformulated
the Restatement principles into a uniform act.20 7 The Restatement's prudent inves-
tor rule was based on certain "principles of prudence": 2 08
1. No investment or technique is imprudent per se.20 9
2. "[S]ound diversification is fundamental to risk management and is there-
fore ordinarily required of trustees." 2 10
3. Trustees must analyze risk and return for each trust and consciously deter-
mine the level of each appropriate to the trust, considering the purposes, beneficia-
ries, required distributions, tax factors and other circumstances of the trust.2 11
4. Trustees must avoid expenses (including fees and transaction costs) that
cannot be justified by the requirements and objectives of the trust.2 12
5. The trustee's duty of impartiality among beneficiaries includes, as relating
to future beneficiaries, protecting the purchasing power of the remainder inter-
estS. 2 13
6. All functions of the trust may be delegated, and the trustee has authority
(and may in some cases have a duty) to delegate as a prudent investor would.2 14
The remainder of this section proceeds to discuss briefly each of these prin-
ciples as reflected in the Restatement and the UPIA.
B. Formulation of the Rule
The Restatement actually made minimal changes in the formulation of the
rule, but the changes it did make are crucial. The Restatement's formulation is:
§ 227. General Standard of Prudent Investment.
The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to invest and manage the funds of
the trust as a prudent investor would, in light of the purposes, terms, distribution
requirements and other circumstances of the trust.2 15
205. See RESTMrENT, supra note 5. The reformulation was passed at the ALl annual meeting
in 1990.
206. See id.
207. This Act was called the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (1994).
208. See RsTAmNTrr, supra note 5, Introduction.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. RESTATEMENr, supra note 5, § 227. The remaining portions of § 227 will be quoted in
succeeding subsections of this section as appropriate. The UPIA formulation is similar. "A
trustee shall invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor would, by considering the
purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust." Id. supra note
6, § 2(a). The corresponding portion of the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TRuSTS § 227 (1959) was:
Investments Which a Trustee Can Properly Make
In making investments of trust funds, the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary
(a) in the absence of provisions in the terms of the trust or of a statute otherwise
providing, to make such investments and only such investments as a prudent man
would make of his-own property having in view the preservation of the estate and the
amount and regularity of the income to be derived.
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First, the change in the title from the Restatement (Second) is significant. The
new standard is general and avoids any reference to proper investments. The new
provision was intended to preserve the flexibility of the original rule and extend
it.2 16 Symbolically significant is the change from "prudent man" to "prudent in-
vestor," indicating an intention to cleanse the rule of its prior rigidity and to em-
brace modem investment theory.2 17 In addition, by omitting any reference to "his
own property," the Restatement does away with the controversy over whether the
standard was the management of the prudent man's own funds or the funds of
others.2 18 Of great significance also is the deletion of the reference to "preserva-
tion of the estate and amount and regularity of income." 2 19 This will be discussed
in a later subsection.22 0 It should be noted that the rule is a default rule which can
be overridden by a provision in the governing instrument. 22 1
The provision in the Restatement concerning the "purposes, distribution re-
quirements, and other circumstances of the trust" is new and is intended to empha-
size that the investment strategy of the trust should be formulated with many fac-
tors taken into account. Such factors include the terms of the trust,222 the eco-
nomic circumstances and needs of the beneficiaries, 22 3 the cash needs of the trust,224
the distribution requirements (both regular and unusual), 225 the tax brackets of the
beneficiaries, 2 26 the tax effects of the timing of capital gains, and fees. 22 7
216. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 227, cmt. a, reporter's notes, general notes at 59. The
new title omits any reference to investments being proper. For § 227 of RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TRusrs see supra note 215.
217. See RESTATEmENT, supra note 5, cmts. e, h.
218. See id., reporter's notes, general notes at 59.
219. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TRusTs § 227 (1959).
220. See discussion infra Section VLE.
221. REsTATEmENT, supra note 5, § 227(d).
222. See Halbach, supra note 2, at 1167-68, n.57.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See Altfest, supra note 68, at 21.
227. See id. at 21-22. UPIA provides:
Among circumstances that a trustee shall consider in investing and managing trust
assets are such of the following as are relevant to the trust or its beneficiaries:
(1) general economic conditions;
(2) the possible effect of inflation or deflation;
(3) the expected tax consequences of investment decisions or strategies;
(4) the role that each investment or course of action plays within the overall trust
portfolio, which may include financial assets, interests in closely held enterprises,
tangible and intangible personal property, and real property;
(5) the expected total return from income and the appreciation of capital;
(6) other resources of the beneficiaries;
(7) needs for liquidity, regularity of income, and preservation or appreciation of capi-
tal; and
(8) an asset's special relationship or special value, if any, to the purposes of the trust
or to one or more of the beneficiaries.
UPIA, supra note 6, § 2(c).
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C Adoption of Modern Portfolio Theory
Both the Restatement228 and the LPIA2 29 specifically accept modem portfo-
lio theory in the sense that a portfolio should be constructed by ascertaining the
risk tolerance and return objectives of the trust.23 0 Both require the trustee to be
sensitive to risk and return, and both recognize that risk tolerance varies greatly in
each trust.2 3 1 The comments to the Restatement2 32 and the Reporter's Notes23 3
contain an extensive discussion of the elements of modem portfolio theory, in-
cluding the relationship of risk and return. While the Restatement does note that
"[tihere are no universally accepted and enduring theories of financial markets or
prescriptions for investment that can provide clear and specific guidance to trust-
ees and courts,' 2 34 and that varied investment approaches to investing trust funds
are permitted,2 35 the prudent investor rule is clearly designed with modem portfo-
lio theory in mind. 236 However, the Reporter for the Restatement has said:
The prudent investor project was undertaken with a clear recognition that trust
investment law should reflect and accommodate current knowledge and concepts
in the financial community. While seeking to incorporate the lessons of modem
experience and research, a scrupulous effort was made to avoid either endorsing
or excluding particular theories of economics or investment. In addition, an im-
portant objective in drafting the prudent investor rule was to preserve the flex-
ibility necessary for the incorporation of future learning and developments ....
The rules are designed to be general and flexible enough to adapt to the changes
that may occur over time in the financial world.237
228. REsrTA ~r provides:
This [prudent investor] standard requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and
caution, and is to be applied to investments not in isolation but in the context of the
trust portfolio and as a part of an overall investment strategy, which should incorpo-
rate risk and return objectives reasonably suitable to the trust.
RnsTAin ET, supra note 5, § 227(a).
229. UPIA provides:
A trustee's investment and management decisions respecting individual assets must
be evaluated not in isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio as a whole and as
part of an overall investment strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably
suited to the trust.
UPIA, supra note 6, § 2(b). It is interesting that the UPIA replaces the Restatement's "should"
with 'must," mandating the trustee to use a risk and return analysis.
230. Modem portfolio theory and the relationship of risk and return were discussed supra in
Section III. See also Robert Cooter and Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. RPv. 1045. 1062-63 (1991).
231. See UPIA, supra note 6, § 2 cmt.; Rfts ENr, supra note 5, § 227 cmrts. e-h.
232. See RESTATEmENT, supra note 5, § 227 cmts. e-i.
233. See REsrmm'Tr, supra note 5, § 227 reporter's notes on cmts. c-h at 74-79.
234. RasTAnenrr, supra note 5, § 227 cmt. f.
235. See id.
236. See Hora, supra note 63, at 28; Aalberts & Poon, supra note 35, at 54.
237. Halbach, supra note 2, at 1154. See also REst .IENr, supra note 5, Introduction, at 5;
Lyman W. Welch, How the Prudent InvestorRule MayAffect Trustees, TL & Esr. Dec. 1991,15,16.
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D. Total Portfolio Approach
Under the prudent man rule, assets were evaluated individually with no con-
sideration of the role of the asset in the total trust portfolio.23 8 Modern portfolio
theory teaches that the proper focus is on the total portfolio, and each asset must be
evaluated in light of its effects on the total portfolio.239 Indeed, this is one of the
prime tenets of modem portfolio theory.24 0 In accordance with modem economic
theory, both the Restatement2 4 1 and the UPIA242 require that each investment be
viewed as a part of the overall trust portfolio. The significance of this approach,
which has been previously discussed,24 3 is summarized in the UPIA comment to
section 2:
Portfolio standard. Subsection (b) emphasizes the consolidated portfolio stan-
dard for evaluating investment decisions. An investment that might be impru-
dent standing alone can become prudent if undertaken in sensible relation to other
trust assets, or to other nontrust assets. In the trust setting the term "portfolio"
embraces the entire trust estate.244
E. Preservation of Purchasing Power
Under the traditional prudent man rule, the trustee's duty was to preserve the
estate.24 5 This was meant to avoid losses to the estate; it did not encompass pro-
tection of the remainder interest against inflation.24 6 Both the Restatement247 and
the UpIA248 have recognized that modem portfolio theory requires that the pur-
chasing power of the trust corpus be preserved.249 It has been predicted that under
238. See sources cited supra note 199.
239. See William S. Hershberger, Fiduciary Investing in the 90's-Restatement Third of Trusts:
Panacea or Placebo, 27 Pinur E. H KOUING INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1 500, 1 503.4(B) at 5-23
(1993). See also Aalberts & Poon, supra note 35, at 63.
240. See Aalberts and Poon, supra note 35, at 63. See also Langbein & Posner, supra note 69,
at 890. See supra Section III.
241. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 227(a), also quoted in supra note 228.
242. UPIA, supra note 6, § 2(b), quoted in note 229.
243. See supra Sections III and V.
244. UPIA, supra note 6, § 2 cmt.
245. See RSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 227 (1957).
246. See id.
247. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 227, cmt. e, which discusses the necessity of preserv-
ing the purchasing power of the trust property as a part of the requirement of caution, and states:
[T]his requirement of caution requires the trustee to invest with a view both to safety
of the capital and to securing a reasonable return.
"Safety" of capital includes not only the objective of protecting the trust property
from the risk of loss of nominal value but, ordinarily, also a goal of preserving its real
value-that is, seeking to avoid or reduce loss of the trust estate's purchasing power
as a result of inflation.
248. See UPIA, supra note 6, § 2(c)(2), which directs the trustee to consider "the possible
effect of inflation or deflation" in investing.
249. See Aalberts & Poon, supra note 35, at 62-63; Herschberger, supra note 239, at I1503.5(C)
5-28 to 29; Alffest, supra note 68, at 20; John A. Taylor, Massachusetts'Influence in Shaping the
Prudent Investor Rulefor Trusts, 78 MAss. L. REv. 51, 59 (1993); Phillips, supra note 82, at 360;
Sages, supra note 199, at 26.
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the Restatement and the UPIA sacrificing return for low risk by selection of a
conservative portfolio composed of traditional conservative investments (such as
bonds, treasury bills, certificates of deposit and savings accounts, and even some
equities that emphasize dividends over appreciation) that permit inflation to erode
the purchasing power of the corpus would constitute a breach of the duty of cau-
tion, and create liability to the trust beneficiaries.25 0
The second part of this change is that "return" in modem portfolio theory
means total return, including both income and appreciation. 25 1 In modem portfo-
lio theory, the type of return is irrelevant; maximizing total return at a given level
of risk is the objective.2 52 Several authors have noted that in the trust investment
context such a definition of return could create a conflict between the income ben-
eficiaries and remaindermen.2 53 This could occur, for example, when the strategy
adopted by the trustee to maximize return at the risk tolerance of the trust required
heavy investment in low dividend, high growth stocks or, inversely, in high yield,
low growth stocks. 2 54 The Restatement recognizes this problem25 5 and, while not
suggesting an allocation formula to balance income and growth assets for any par-
ticular trust,2 56 it recommends that the trustee use its best judgment to balance the
interests of all beneficiaries in light of all the circumstances of the trust.257 The
Restatement recognizes that preservation of the purchasing power of the corpus
may be impossible in certain circumstances.2 58 Further discussion of the solution
to the potential conflict between the duty of impartiality and the total return con-
cept of modem portfolio theory is beyond the scope of this article.25 9
250. See Horn, supra note 63, at 30; Taylor, supra note 249, at 51-52.
251. See RrA-mwNT, supra note 5, § 227, cmt. e; UPIA, supra note 5, § 2(c)(5); Macey,
supra note 54, at 60-61; Butler, supra note 55, at 132; Gordon, supra note 4, at 99-101.
252. See Macey, supra note 54, at 62.
253. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 100-01; Macey, supra note 54, at 60-62; Butler, supra note
55, at 132-33; Joel C. Dobris, New Forms of Private Trusts for the Twenty-First Century-
Principal and Income, 31 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 1, 3 (1996).
254. See Halbach, supra note 2, at 1171-72.
255. See RESTATmErr, supra note 5, § 232, cML C.
256. See Taylor, supra note 249, at 59.
257. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 227, crL e.
258. See id., supra note 5.
259. This problem has been recognized by commentators with differing suggestions. One
author suggests that the trustee may have to forego investing in some of its preferred selections
to satisfy the duty of impartiality. See Dobris, supra note 253, at 3. Several authors have sug-
gested the increased use of fully discretionary trusts, with a payment of a percentage of the total
return to the current beneficiary mandated by the governing instrument or allocated in the trustee's
discretion. See also Butler, supra note 55, at 133-34; Macey, supra note 54, at 60-61; Halbach,
supra note 2, at 1171; REsATEwMNT, supra note 5, § 227, cMt. i; Martin, supra note 40, at46; Joel
C. Dobris, Real Return, Modern Portfolio Theory, and College, University and Foundation De-
cisions on Annual Spending from Endowments: A Visit to the World of Spending Rules, 28 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 49, 80 (1993). Giving the trustee power to invade principal for the current
beneficiary has also been suggested. See id. at 79; Halbach, supra note 2, at 1171. Prior to the
Restatement, it was suggested that the payout be geared to the actual long-term yield of the trust,
with a separate account to reflect surpluses and shortfalls. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 102-07.
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F No Investment Is Imprudent Per Se
In conformity with modem portfolio theory, both the Restatement2 60 and the
UPIA261 permit a trustee to hold any investment as part of a trust and to use any
investment technique. No investment is imprudent in and of itself.262 The basis
of this rule is the finding of modem portfolio theory that an investment which is
risky in itself can actually reduce the overall volatility of a trust portfolio because
it moves inversely to the other investments. 26 3 Moreover, to generate a higher rate
of return, higher risk is required, which may be appropriate for some trusts.2 64
The rejection of the rule that speculative investments are imprudent in all circum-
stances increases the flexibility of trustees in designing the trust portfolio and the
adaptability of the rule to approve new investment vehicles and techniques.2 65
Trustees are now allowed to evaluate and include in trust portfolios, where appro-
priate, risky investments such as venture capital and junk bonds,2 66 mortgages and
other asset-backed securities and real estate,267 stripped securities, currency and
interest rate swaps, Eurobonds, financial futures, options,26 8 various equity de-
rivatives,2 69 and foreign stocks.27 0 It should be noted that these assets may be
inappropriate for many, if not most, trust portfolios and for those in which they
may be appropriate, they will probably only be includable in small amounts.2 7 1
The important point is that trustees may consider the use of these investments and
techniques in constructing the trust portfolio.2 72
260. R=STATEmENT, supra note 5, § 227, cmt. f.
261. See UPIA, supra note 6, § 2(e), which provides: "A trustee may invest in any kind of
property or type of investment consistent with the standards of this [Act]." Id.
262. See RESTATEM Nr, supra note 5, § 227, cmt. f; Halbach, supra note 2, at 1155, 1166;
Langbein, supra note 35, at 649-50; Bevis Longstreth, Tailoring Prudence: Using Circumstances,
Not Absolutes, to Judge Fiduciaries, TR. & EST. Sept. 1986 at 14, 16 [hereinafter Longstreth,
Tailoring Prudence]; Levy, supra note 49, at 7.
263. See RESTATEmENr, supra note 5, § 227, cmt. e; Levy, supra note 49, at 7.
264. See Longstreth, Tailoring Prudence, supra note 262, at 16; Young, supra note 40, at 10-
i1.
265. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 227 reporter's notes to cmt.'k; Halbach, supra note 2,
at 1155.
266. See Halbach, supra note 2, at 1166.
267. See Taylor, supra note 249, at 62.
268. See Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current
Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEXAS L. Rsv. 1369, 1370 (1991). See generally Henry T. C. Hu,
New Financial Products, the Modem Process of Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of Share-
holder Welfare, 69 TEXAs L. Rav. 273 (1991).
269. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial Innovation's Newest
Challenge to the Tax System, 69 TEXAS L. Rav. 1319, 1323 (1991).
270. See Penner, supra note 56, at 638, 641-43; Langbein, supra note 35, at 659.
271. One author has stated that to use non-traditional investments, such as many of those
mentioned above, a $10,000,000 portfolio is required. These investments are highly volatile
and under-diversified, generally produce little income, are highly illiquid, and require expertise
because the markets in which they exist are not efficient. See Nancy L. Jacob, Portfolio Man-
agement and Non-Traditional Investing, TR. & EsT. June, 1995 at 14, 14.
272. For the steps involved in constructing a portfolio, see Aalberts & Poon, supra note 35, at
67-69.
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G. Diversification
Under the prior prudent man rule, diversification was generally required, but
only to minimize the risk of large losses.27 3 In modem portfolio theory, however,
diversification assumes far greater importance. Diversification is required to re-
duce as far as possible the risk of a portfolio that is not compensated for by the
market by way of greater return. 274 A major finding of modem portfolio theory is
that, since different investments react differently to events effecting the economy,
an investment can reduce risk if it reacts differently to events than do the other
investments in the portfolio.2 75 Therefore, unless "the objectives of both prudent
risk management and impartiality can be satisfied" without diversification, or un-
less circumstances peculiar to the trust (such as the continuation of a family busi-
ness) are involved, diversification is required for all trusts.276
The problem then becomes how much and what types of diversification are
required. Various "optimum" numbers of securities necessary for diversification2 7 7
and various types of investments which should be held have been suggested.27 8
Wisely, both the Restatement279 and the UPIA2 80 avoid any specification as to the
exact number or type of investments to be held by a particular trust.
H. Duty To Limit Costs
A new portion of the prudent investor rule-one which has engendered some
controversy-is the duty to limit costs.2 81 This duty is at least partially derived
from both the increased requirement of diversification, discussed previously,282
273. See RETATmEmNT (SEcoND) TRUSTS § 228. cmt. a, which states in part: "The trustee is
under a duty to the beneficiary to exercise prudence in diversifying the investments so as to
minimize the risk of large losses, and therefore he should not invest a disproportionately large
part of the trust estate in a particular security or type of security." Id.
274. See RESTATENT, supra note 5, § 227, cmt. e.; see also supra Section IlI.
275. See RE ATEMNTr, supra note 5, § 227, cmt. g.
276. Id.; see also UPIA supra note 6, § 3. Among the special circumstances mentioned are
the capital gains cost of selling low basis securities in a tax sensitive trust and the desire to retain
a family business. See id, cmt.; IESTATEMrr, supra note 5, § 228, cmt. c. It should be noted that
preservation of a family farm should constitute a special situation which might relieve the trustee
(at least partially) of the duty to diversify. See RESATEENT, supra note 6, § 228, cmt. e, Illus. 5;
Langbein, supra note 35, at 665; Gordon, supra note 4, at 98.
277. See, e.g., Penner, supra note 56, at 633-34 (50 assets); Aalberts & Poon, supra note 35,
at 69 (40-50 securities in the portion of the portfolio devoted to equities); Langbein & Posner.
supra note 69, at 889 (about 200 stocks necessary in order to reduce the risk to a one percent
gain or loss).
278. See, e.g., Penner, supra note 56, at 642-43 (stating that ignoring international invest-
ments is a breach of duty); Stephen P. Johnson, Trustee Investments: The Prudent Person Rule
or Modern Portfolio Theory, You Make The Choice, 44 SY.Acuss L REv. 1175, 1183 (1993)
(suggesting inclusion of nontraditional investments). RmrTATE.ET, supra note5, § 227, reporter's
note, general note on cmts. e to h at 77 (significant diversification achievable with small number
of securities).
279. See id. See also REsTAT E T, supra note 5, § 227, cmt. g.
280. See UPIA, supra note 6, § 4, cmt.
281. See RmESATEmET, supra note 5, § 227(c)(3), which provides "(c) In addition, the trustee
must: ... (3) incur only costs that are reasonable in amount and appropriate to the investment
responsibility of the trusteeship." Id. The UPIA is similar. Section 7, entitled "Investment Costs,"
provides: "In investing and managing trust assets, a trustee may only incur costs that are appro-
priate and reasonable in relation to the assets, the purposes of the trust, and the skills of the
trustee." UPIA, supra note 6, § 7.
282. See supra Section VI.G.
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and the efficient market hypothesis which is part of modern portfolio theory.2 83
The efficient market hypothesis broadly teaches that in efficient markets, all infor-
mation is reflected in a stock's price within an extremely short time after the infor-
mation becomes available. 2 84 Thus, it is extremely difficult to "beat the market,"
despite the expertise of fiduciaries, their employees, brokers, or others.2 85 There-
fore, at least as to the major securities markets, which are efficient, paying large
expenses, especially broker's commissions, is wasteful because empirical research
has revealed that such effort rarely yields returns in excess of market returns.286
Therefore, incurring costs in an attempt to outperform the market in an efficient
market would be wasteful. While scrupulously avoiding any condemnation of ac-
tive strategies, 2 87 the overall tone of the Restatement comments leaves a firm im-
pression that a primarily passive strategy which holds down costs is preferred. The
Restatement, as a beginning, clearly authorizes mutual funds as a trust investment
which does not violate the delegation rules. 28 8 Indeed, for a relatively small trust,
mutual funds are almost a necessity, since reasonable diversification is otherwise
extremely difficult to achieve without high transaction costs.289 The Restatement
concludes: "Therefore, given the fiduciary duty to avoid excessive administration
expense.., purchasing suitable mutual fund shares may be more inviting to the
trustee because it offers a means of obtaining much greater diversification for what
will usually be a lower cost."'290 The Restatement then compares passive and
active strategies. A program of passive strategies, primarily investing in index
funds,29 1 is termed "a practical investment alternative to be considered by trust-
ees,"2 92 offering the advantages of economy, price security, and diversification. 2 93
A suggestion is made that debt instruments, such as short-term federal obligations,
be used to lower the risk of a portfolio composed mainly of index funds, and bor-
rowing be used to raise return. 294 In contrast, while active management strategies
are allowed, and admitted to be necessary in certain situations, the Restatement
notes the normal high transaction costs of such strategies and requires, if these
costs are substantial, that they be justified by "realistically evaluated return expec-
tations." 295
The general tone of the comments to the Restatement, and the emphasis on
cost containment, have led commentators to state that a trustee's only rational strat-
egy is to buy a market index fund and borrow if a higher return is desired, or buy
283. See supra Section III.
284. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 227, reporter's note, general note on cmts. e through h,
at 75.
285. See id.; see also Young, supra note 40, at 11.
286. See R STATEmENr, supra note 5, § 227, reporter's note, general note on cmts. e through h,
at 75.
287. See id. § 227, cmt. h.
288. See id., cmt. m.
289. See id., cmt. h.
290. Id. The Restatement does caution that such an approach requires knowledge of different
types of funds, and the fees and dangers of each type. See id.
291. See infra notes 296-301, discussing index funds.
292. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 227, cmt. h.
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. Id.
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risldess assets, such as Treasury notes, to reduce portfolio risk.296 Others predict
that the Restatement's emphasis on cost control might be read as mandating a pas-
sive strategy and requiring considerable justification for an active strategy.297
An index fund is a fund that buys securities in proportion to their value on an
exchange or listing of all or of a particular type of stock, bond or other invest-
ment. 298 Because the fund only buys or sells a security when a significant change
in the price of the security occurs or when an investment is added to or dropped
from the index measuring the fund, index funds have a "buy and hold" strategy
which insures low transaction costs.299 Indeed, one author has suggested that
trustees should prefer no-load funds over funds having a sales charge because of
lower costs.300 In fact, given the growth of index funds in recent years, a trustee
can get an index fund which invests in almost any type of asset desired.3 01 There-
fore, there would appear to be limited need or justification for investing in other
than index funds.
Where are active strategies useful? Such strategies are primarily useful in
markets that are less efficient than the major securities markets.302 The major
areas where the markets are less efficient and active management may bejustified
include real estate,303 venture capital,304 foreign securities,3 05 financial deriva-
tives, such as distressed debt and managed futures,3 06 arbitrage,307 private equity
partnerships, 308 and hedged funds.309
While active strategies are expressly permitted, current views on market effi-
ciency indicate the advisability of serious consideration of index funds.310 But
trustees should note the warning from the Reporter of the Restatement when con-
sidering active investment strategies:
296. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 35, at 18.
297. See Hershberger, supra note 239, atl 503.6(D) 5-33-34. See also Halbach, supra note 2,
at 1164-66; Altfest, supra note 68, at 20-21; Langbein & Posner, supra note 69, at 888; Butler.
supra note 55, at 125-28.
298. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 227, cmt. h.
299. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 69, at 888.
300. See Altfest, supra note 68, at 20-21.
301. The first index fund was offered on June 7, 1973. See Robert Frick, Reality Check. A
Diary of a Bear Market, KItuGER''S PERSONALFWAVCE MaA7tN, OcL 1997, at 91, 94. As of late
1996, 133 index funds existed, and many more were expected. See Ken Sheets, The Agony and
the Index, KIUNGER'S PERSONAL FiNANCE MAGAzINE, Oct. 1996, at 77. Among existing types of
index funds were international funds, funds indexed to the Dow Jones 30, the Standard & Poor
500, the STPI BARRA Growth Index, the Russell 2000 Index of Small Company Stocks, and
many others. See id at 77-81.
302. See RESTAMENr, supra note 5, § 227, cmt. h; Martin, supra note 40. at 45; Aalberts &
Poon, supra note 35, at 70.
303. See Butler, supra note 55, at 126-27; Halbach, supra note 2, at 1163: Jacob, supra note
271, at 14.
304. See Butler, supra note 55, at 126-27; Halbach, supra note 2, at 1163; Jacob, supra note
271, at 24-29.
305. See Langbein, supra note 35, at 659-60; Penner, supra note 56, at 638-43.
306. See Jacob, supra note 271, at 21-24, 29-32.
307. See id. at 21.
308. See id.
309. See id
310. See Halbach, supra note 2, at 1162.
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Cost and risk concerns should be taken carefully into account in deciding whether
to undertake a particular active investment strategy and also in implementing
that strategy. In particular, prudent fund managers should cautiously and realisti-
cally evaluate increased return expectations before concluding that these expec-
tations justify the extra costs that typically result from active investment pro-
grams.... The greater the departure from sound passive strategies, the greater
the manager's burden becomes, not only of justification but also of continuous
monitoring.3 11
L Delegation
Historically, a trustee was permitted to delegate only ministerial tasks; discre-
tionary duties (including the choice of investments) were not delegable and were
required to be performed by the trustee personally.3 12 Dissatisfaction with the
rule became widespread, partly due to the complexity of investment alternatives
available 3 13 and partly because the vagueness of the rule gave little guidance to
trustees as to what was ministerial and what was discretionary.3 14 Both the Re-
statement3 15 and the UPIA3 16 reverse the delegation rule and permit such delega-
tion as a prudent investor would exercise in the circumstances.
Delegation is not limited to ministerial acts.3 17 The Restatement does not
permit full delegation of the duties of the trustee; the trustee must at least define
the trustee's investment objectives and must approve the investment plan and strat-
egy of the trust.3 18 While the UPIA is more detailed, calling for the exercise of
"reasonable care, skill and caution" in delegation of powers and duties, 3 19 it is
311. Id. at 1165-66.
312. See John H. Langbein, Reversing the Nondelegation Rule of Trust-Investment Law, 59
Mo. L. REv. 105, 108-09 (1994); Langbein, supra note 35, at 650-51; Young, supra note 40, at
28-29.
313. See Langbein, supra note 35, at 650-52.
314. See Langbein, supra note 312, at 108-09.
315. See REsTATEmENT, supra note 5, § 171; § 227, cmt.j.
316. See UPIA, supra note 6, § 9(a).
317. See REsTATEmENT, supra note 5, § 171, cmt. f.
318. See id, § 227, cmt. j.
319. Section 9 of the UPIA provides:
§ 9. Delegation of Investment and Management Functions.
(a)A trustee may delegate investment and management functions that a prudent
trustee of comparable skills could properly delegate under the circumstances. The
trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution in:
(1) selecting an agent;
(2) establishing the scope and terms of the delegation, consistent with the pur-
poses and terms of the trust; and
(3) periodically reviewing the agent's actions in order to monitor the agent's
performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation.
(b) In performing a delegated function, an agent owes a duty to the trust to
exercise reasonable care to comply with the terms of the delegation.
(c) A trustee who complies with the requirements of subsection (a) is not liable
to the beneficiaries or to the trust for the decisions or actions of the agent to whom the
function was delegated.
(d) By accepting the delegation of a trust function from the trustee of a trust that
is subject to the law of this State, an agent submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of
this State.
UPIA, supra note 6, at § 9.
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doubtful if the difference in wording between the UPIA and the Restatement is
intended to indicate a difference in philosophy or standards. The intention of lib-
eralizing the delegation rule was to enable trustees to take advantage of expert
advice in investment decisions, 320 and most commentators agree that the hiring of
an investment manager or an advisor to consult periodically about the trust's port-
folio is permitted under the new rules.32 1 The trustee must use prudence, care, and
skill in hiring the advisor or investment manager, supervising his performance,
and monitoring his activities. 322
The reversal of the delegation rules has generated significant comment. One
author proposes the use of a special trustee for investments or for a particular asset
if desired by the grantor.323 The new rule has been commended for increasing the
possibility of family members (and other individuals) being able to act as trustees
because of their ability to procure outside investment advice.324 Another com-
mentator views the rule as contrary to a grantor's expectations, arguing that the
grantor chose the trustee because of the grantor's reliance on the trustee's skill and
abilities. 325 The grantor intended the trustee to perform discretionary duties per-
sonally, whereas the new rule allows the trustee to delegate those duties.326 The
commentators have also debated over whether, and in what circumstances, there
may be a duty to delegate investment functions. 3 27
VII. THE RESTATEMENT AND UPIA IN STATE LEGISLATURES AND THE COURTS
A. Adoption of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act
As of January 1, 1998, the UPIA has been adopted in full or with minor modi-
fications in 19 states.328 Seven other states have adopted statutes which incorpo-
320. See REASmNr, supra note 5, Introduction at 7.
321. See Altfest, supra note 68, at 21, 22-23; Young, supra note 40, at 31; Halbach, supra
note 2, at 1173-74.
322. See R rrEmrw, supra note 5, Introduction at 7; Langbein, supra note 312, at 110;
Altfest, supra note 68, at 22-23.
323. See Horn, supra note 63, at 33.
324. See Taylor, supra note 249, at 52. Grantors and testators may often believe that family
members are more sensitive to a beneficiary's circumstances and need for trust funds than banks.
For such grantors, the new delegation rule offers the best of both worlds. The family member
can act as trustee, bringing his knowledge and skill in family relations to the trust, while obtain-
ing investment advice from a bank or other financial manager. One author has noted that acting
as an investment manager, advisor or as consultant on risk, return, and asset allocation for trust-
ees may represent a new opportunity for banks. See Sager, supra note 199, at 27.
325. See Jerome J. Curtis, Jr., The Transmogrification of the American Trust, 31 REAL PRO?..
PROB. & TR. J. 251,273 (1996).
326. See id. at 273-75.
327. See Young, supra note 40, at 28-29; Langbein, supra note 312, at 109-10; Hershberger,
supra note 239, 1 503.5, at 5-28. See also RESTAmr, supra note 5, § 227, Cmt. j. This question
is beyond the scope of this article.
328. See Amz. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 14-7601 (Vest Supp. 1997); AmK. Coos ANN. §§ 24-3-417-
426 (Michie Supp. 1997); CAL. PROB. CODE § 16045 (West Supp. 1998); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §
15-1.1-101 (Bradford 1997); 1997 CoNN. LEGis. SEav. P.A. 97-140; HAwAI REv. STAT. §§ 554
B-l-B-12 (1995); IDAHO CODE § 68-501 (Michie Supp. 1998); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 7-
302 (West 1998); Mm. STAT. ANN. § 501B.151 (Vest 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.900 (West
Supp. 1998); Neb. Laws L.B. 102; NJ. STAT. ANN. § 3B: 20-11.1 (West Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 45-7-601 (Michie 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-02-08.1 (Michie Supp. 1997): OVLt.
STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.60 (West Supp. 1998); OR. REv. STAT. § 128.192
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rate many of the concepts of the UPIA, but do not adopt its language. 329 This
represents quick and widespread adoption for a four-year-old statute, indicating
that state legislatures approve of the principles of modern portfolio theory as ap-
plied to trust investments.
(Oreg. Leg. Coun. Com. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-15-1 (Michie 1996); UTAH CODEANN. § 75-
7-302 (Lexis Supp. 1998); W. VA. CODE § 44-6C- 1 (Michie 1997). Although N.Y. Est. Powers &
Trusts § 11-2.3 is often added to this list, the New York statute, though having the same objec-
tives and purposes as the UPIA, differs from it substantially in form. N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts
§ 11-2.3 is quoted in note 329, infra.
329. The first of these statutes was adopted by Illinois in 1992 and was based on a draft of the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INvEsTOR RuLE (Proposed Final Draft 1990). The stat-
ute, currently 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5 (West 1992) provides:
Sec. 5. Investments. (a) Prudent Investor Rule. A trustee administering a trust has a
duty to invest and manage the trust assets as follows:
(1) The trustee has a duty to invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor
would considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circum-
stances of the trust. This standard requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and
caution and is to be applied to investments not in isolation, but in the context of the
trust portfolio as a whole and as a part of an overall investment strategy that should
incorporate risk and return objectives reasonably suitable to the trust.
(2) No specific investment or course of action is, taken alone, prudent or imprudent.
The trustee may invest in every kind of property and type of investment, subject to
this Section. The trustee's investment decisions and actions are to be judged in terms
of the trustee's reasonable business judgment regarding the anticipated effect on the
trust portfolio as a whole under the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time of
the decision or action. The prudent investor rule is a test of conduct and not of result-
ing performance.
(3) The trustee has a duty to diversify the investments of the trust unless, under the
circumstances, the trustee reasonably believes it is in the interests of the beneficiaries
and furthers the purposes of the trust not to diversify.
(4) The trustee has a duty, within a reasonable time after the acceptance of the trust-
eeship, to review trust assets and to make and implement decisions concerning the
retention and disposition of original pre-existing investments in order to conform to
the provisions of this Section. The trustee's decision to retain or dispose of an asset
may properly be influenced by the asset's special relationship or value to the purposes
of the trust or to some or all of the beneficiaries, consistent with the trustee's duty of
impartiality.
(5) The trustee has a duty to pursue an investment strategy that considers both the
reasonable production of income and safety of capital, consistent with the trustee's
duty of impartiality and the purposes of the trust. Whether investments are
underproductive or overproductive of income shall be judged by the portfolio as a
whole and not as to any particular asset.
(6) The circumstances that the trustee may consider in making investment decisions
include, without limitation, the general economic conditions, the possible effect of
inflation, the expected tax consequences of investment decisions or strategies, the
role each investment or course of action plays within the overall portfolio, the ex-
pected total return (including both income yield and appreciation of capital), and the
duty to incur only reasonable and appropriate costs. The trustee may but need not
consider related trusts and the assets of beneficiaries when making investment deci-
sions.
(b) The provisions of this Section may be expanded, restricted, eliminated, or
otherwise altered by express provisions of the trust instrument. The trustee is not
liable to a beneficiary for the trustee's reasonable and good faith reliance on those
express provisions.
(c) Nothing in this Section abrogates or restricts the power of an appropriate
court in proper cases (i) to direct or permit the trustee to deviate from the terms of the
trust instrument or (ii) to direct or permit the trustee to take, or to restrain the trustee
from taking, any action regarding the making or retention of investments.
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(d) The following terms or comparable language in the investment powers and
related provisions of a trust instrument, unless otherwise limited or modified by that
instrument, shall be construed as authorizing any investment or strategy permitted
under this Section: "investments permissible by law for investment of trust funds,"
'legal investments," "authorized investments," "using the judgment and care under
the circumstances then prevailing that men of prudence, discretion, and intelligence
exercise in the management of their own affairs, not in regard to the speculation but
in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable in-
come as well as the probable safety of their capital," "prudent man rule," and "pru-
dent person rule."
(e) On and after the effective date of this amendatory Art of 1991, this Section
applies to all existing and future trusts, but only as to actions or inactions occurring
after that effective date.
Id Four states have enacted statutes which were modeled on the Illinois statute. See FLA. STAr.
ANN. § 518.11 (West 1997) (enacted in 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-5004 (1995) (enacted in
1993); MN. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 15-114 (Michie Supp. 1996) (enacted in 1994); VA.
CoDE ANN. § 26-45.1 (Michie 1997) (enacted in 1992). Washington in 1995 enacted a statute
blending the UPIA and Illinois approaches. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 11.100.020 (Vest
1998). In 1994 New York enacted perhaps the most comprehensive statute not modeled after the
UPIA. N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUSTS § 11-2.3 (West Supp. 1998) provides:
§ 11-2.3 Prudent investor act
(a)Prudent investor rule.
A trustee has a duty to invest and manage property held in a fiduciary capacity in
accordance with the prudent investor standard defined by this section, except as oth-
erwise provided by the express terms and provisions of a governing instrument within
the limitations set forth by section 11-1.7 of this chapter. This section shall apply to
any investment made or held on or after January first, nineteen hundred ninety-five
by a trustee.
(b)Prudent investor standard.
(l)The prudent investor rule requires a standard of conduct, not outcome or per-
formance. Compliance with the prudent investor rule is determined in light of facts
and circumstances prevailing at the time of the decision or action of a trustee. A
trustee is not liable to a beneficiary to the extent that the trustee acted in substantial
compliance with the prudent investor standard or in reasonable reliance on the ex-
press terms and provisions of the governing instrument.
(2)A trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill and caution to make and imple-
ment investment and management decisions as a prudent investor would for the entire
portfolio, taking into account the purposes and terms and provisions of the governing
instrument.
(3)The prudent investor standard requires a trustee:
(A) to pursue an overall investment strategy to enable the trustee to make appro-
priate present and future distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiaries under
the governing instrument, in accordance with risk and return objectives reasonably
suited to the entire portfolio;
(B) to consider, to the extent relevant to the decision or action, the size of the
portfolio, the nature and estimated duration of the fiduciary relationship, the liquidity
and distribution requirements of the governing instrument, general economic condi-
tions, the possible effect of inflation or deflation, the expected tax consequences of
investment decisions or strategies and of distributions of income and principal, the
role that each investment or course of action plays within the overall portfolio, the
expected total return of the portfolio (including both income and appreciation of capi-
tal), and the needs of beneficiaries (to the extent reasonably known to the trustee) for
present and future distributions authorized or required by the governing instrument;
(C) to diversify assets unless the trustee reasonably determines that it is in the
interests of the beneficiaries not to diversify, taking into account the purposes and
terms and provisions of the governing instrument; and
(D) within a reasonable time after the creation of the fiduciary relationship, to
determine whether to retain or dispose of initial assets.
(4)The prudent investor standard authorizes a trustee:
(A) to invest in any type of investment consistent with the requirements of this
paragraph, since no particular investment is inherently prudent or imprudent for pur-
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poses of the prudent investor standard;
(B) to consider related trusts, the income and resources of beneficiaries to the
extent reasonably known to the trustee, and also an asset's special relationship or
value to some or all of the beneficiaries if consistent with the trustee's duty of impar-
tiality;
(C)to delegate investment and management functions if consistent with the duty
to exercise skill, including special investment skills; and
(D) to incur costs only to the extent they are appropriate and reasonable in
relation to the-purposes of the governing instrument, the assets held by the trustee and
the skills of the trustee.
(5)Special investment skills.
For a bank, trust company or paid professional investment advisor (whether or not
registered under any federal securities or investment law) which serves as a trustee,
and any other trustee representing that such trustee has special investment skills, the
exercise of skill contemplated by the prudent investor standard shall require the trustee
to exercise such diligence in investing and managing assets as would customarily be
exercised by prudent investors of discretion and intelligence having special invest-
ment skills.
(c)Delegation of investment or management functions.
(l)Delegation of an investment or management function requires a trustee to
exercise care, skill and caution in:
(A) selecting a delegee suitable to exercise the delegated function, taking into
account the nature and value of the assets subject to such delegation and the expertise
of the delegee;
(B) establishing the scope and terms of the delegation consistent with the pur-
poses of the governing instrument;
(C) periodically reviewing the delegee's exercise of the delegated function and
compliance with the scope and terms of the delegation; and
(D) controlling the overall cost by reason of the delegation.
(2)The delegee has a duty to the trustee and to the trust to comply with the scope
and terms of the delegation and to exercise the delegated function with reasonable
care, skill and caution. An attempted exoneration of the delegee from liability for
failure to meet such duty is contrary to public policy and void.
(3)By accepting the delegation of a trustee's function from the trustee of a trust
that is subject to the law of New York, the delegee submits to the jurisdiction of the
courts of New York even if a delegation agreement provides otherwise, and the delegee
may be made a party to any proceeding in such courts that places in issue the deci-
sions or actions of the delegee.
(d)Investment in securities of related investment companies.
A trustee holding funds for investment may invest the same in securities of any man-
agement type investment company or trust registered pursuant to the federal invest-
ment company act of nineteen hundred forty, as amended, notwithstanding that the
trustee or an affiliate of the trustee acts as investment advisor, custodian, transfer
agent, registrar, sponsor, distributor, manager or provides other services to the invest-
ment company or trust. Unless the will, lifetime trust or order appointing the trustee
provides otherwise, the trustee shall elect annually either (i) to receive or have its
affiliate receive compensation for providing such services to such investment com-
pany or trust for the portion of the trust invested in such investment company or trust
or (ii) to take annual corporate trustees' commissions with respect to such portion.
(e)As used in this section:
(1) the term "trustee" includes a personal representative, trustee, guardian, do-
nee of a power during minority, guardian under article eighty-one of the menial hy-
giene law, committee of the property of an incompetent person, and conservator of
the property of a conservatee;
(2) the term "trust" includes any fiduciary entity with property owned by a
trustee as defined in this section;
(3) the term "governing instrument" includes a court order; and
(4) the term "portfolio" includes all property of every kind and character held
by a trustee as defined in this section.
Id. In passing, it might be noted that South Dakota enacted a provision similar to the "interme-
diate" statutes discussed in Section V, supra, although South Dakota did not enact its statute
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B. Case Law Under the UPIA and Similar Statutes
Since the UPIA was promulgated only four years ago, it is not surprising that
only two cases have been found construing the UPIA and similar statutes. None of
the cases arose in a UPIA state. Both were decided under the New York statute
previously cited.330 The first held only that the test under the statute is prudence
rather than performance and that poor performance cannot be the basis for holding
a trustee imprudent.331 The other involved the authority of a corporate trustee of
testamentary trusts to delegate investment powers to a family financial advisor,
thus becoming a directed trustee. 332 Under the new New York statute, such del-
egation is permitted if the trustee uses care, skill, and caution in selecting the per-
son, establishing the scope and terms of the delegation, monitoring the delegee's
activities, and controlling the cost.333 Since the will authorized the employment
of agents by the trustees to advise on investments and permitted the trustees to
delegate discretionary powers, the court held that the new statute did not prohibit
the delegation and that the delegation in this case would be "consistent with the
spirit of the statute." 334 The court noted in dicta that ordinarily a corporate fidu-
ciary would not delegate investment powers because it would reduce compensa-
tion, but that delegation would be appropriate in some instances (i.e., when invest-
ing in foreign securities and venture capital). 335
C. The Effect of the Restatement and te UPIA on Cases Not Governed by the New
Statute
If there have not been many cases yet in those states which have adopted the
UPIA or similar statutes, the Restatement and the new statutes may have an unan-
ticipated effect on the analysis of cases not governed by the revised statutes.
The test of prudence under the prudent man rule looked at the propriety of the
individual assets chosen for the portfolio, the performance of discretionary tasks
by the fiduciary without delegation, and the preservation of the nominal value of
the corpus.336 While a few early cases indicated that preserving the corpus might
include keeping up with inflation,3 37 and occasional dicta, primarily in pension
cases, slightly broadened the prudent man rule,338 rarely were these traditional
trust rules challenged. It was hoped that the Restatement's expansive approach
would encourage a gradual move by courts to embrace modem portfolio theory
and to require trustees to become and stay informed about investment vehicles and
330. See supra note 329.
331. See In re Fleet Trust Co., 662 N.Y.S.2d 360, 362 (Sur. Ct. 1997).
332. See Estate of Younker, 663 N.Y.S.2d 946,947 (Sur. CL 1997).
333. See id. at 948.
334. See id.
335. See 1id
336. See supra Sectioti II for a brief discussion of these rules. See also Lo.\asmam. supra
note 4, at 11-22, 39-41.
337. See, e.g., Carlick v. Keiler, 375 SAV.2d 397 (Ky. 1964); In re Mayo, 105 N.W.2d 900
(Minn. 1960) (decided under a deviation theory); Davison v. Duke University, 194 S._.2d 761
(N.C. 1973); In re Carlisle's Will, 278 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (Sur. Ct. 1967). See also Kenneth L
H-irsch, Inflation and the Law of Trusts, 18 REAL PROP., PNoB. & TR. J. 601, 627, 640 (1983).
338. See, e.g., Leigh v. Engle, 858 F.2d 361, 367-68 (7th Cir. 1988).
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strategies. 339 There is some evidence that these hopes may be realized. An impor-
tant case arose in New York in 1995.340 The proceeding was an accounting of
executors covering a twenty-year period. The will created a marital deduction
trust and two other trusts. 34 1 Among the assets in the estate were marketable
securities worth over three million dollars, with almost $1.8 million of that con-
sisting of stock of Eastman Kodak Company.342 The value of Eastman Kodak had
dropped substantially between the decedent's death, in 1973, and the filing of the
accounting, in 1981.343 The charitable remaindermen alleged that the executors
acted imprudently in failing to sell at least some of the Kodak stock.34 4 The case
was decided under New York's former prudent man rule stated in the prior version
of its trusts investment statute.34 5 The court held the executors had acted impru-
dently and surcharged the executors.3 46 What is interesting is that language rarely
seen in previous cases was prominent in the opinion. In discussing the prudent
man rule, the Surrogate's Court stated: "A fiduciary needs to analyze the risks of
a portfolio, the marketability of the holdings, its volatility, and the market condi-
tions then and there prevailing." 347 Although some Kodak stock was sold to pay
expenses, Kodak stock comprised more than 60 percent of the portfolio.3 48 The
court analyzed the executor's reasons for retaining Kodak stock and its allegation
that it conducted periodic reviews, consultations, and monitoring of the portfolio.
To this allegation, the court noted:
Notwithstanding turbulent worldwide economic conditions including an OPEC
oil embargo, all of which resulted in a monumental and precipitous decline in the
stock market during the 1973-74 period, the bank's position continued to be one
to retain the Eastman Kodak stock in its concentrated form. In that one year the
EK stock dropped from approximately $115 a share to about $60 a share. In
summary, the bank's position in demonstrating prudence is that the retention of
the EK was part of a conscious and studied investment plan. In reality, the bank's
responsiveness to the admittedly turbulent and precipitous tenor of the times (1973)
was to do nothing. To assert that mere review, analysis, and monitoring satisfies
the standard of due care by a prudent person where action and activity are indi-
cated, tests the Court's sense of reason and logic .... 349
On appeal, the Appellate Division also wrote differently from previous cases.
While recognizing the rule that the focus was on the individual investment, the
court gave equal weight to the following quotation from a previous case:
339. See Taylor, supra note 249, at 62.
340. See Estate of Janes, 630 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sur. Ct. 1995), modified as to damages, 643
N.Y.S.2d 972 (App. Div. 1996), aff'd, 681 N.E.2d 332 (N.Y. 1997).
341. See Estate of Janes, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 473.
342. See id. This represented 71 percent of the value of the estate's securities portfolio. See
id.
343. See id. at 474.
344. See id. Charities were also income beneficiaries of one of the trusts, which received 25
percent of the estate. See id. at 475.
345. See N.Y. EsT. PowEns & TRUSTs Former § 11-2.2(a)(1) (McKinney 1967). The new
Prudent Investor Act, N.Y. Esr. PowERs & TRUSTS § 11- 2.3(a), did not apply since all invest-
ments in this case were made prior to January 1, 1995, the new section's effective date. See
Estate of Janes, 681 N.E.2d 332, 336 n.* (N.Y. 1997).
346. See Estate of Janes, 630 N.Y.S.2d 472, 479, 481 (Sur. Ct. 1995).
347. Id. at 474-75.
348. See id. at 476.
349. Id. at 477.
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The record of any individual investment is not to be viewed exclusively, of course,
as though it were in its own watertight compartment, since to some extent indi-
vidual investment decisions may properly be affected by considerations of the
performance of the fund as an entity, as in the instance, for example, of indi-
vidual security decisions based in part on considerations of diversification of the
fund or of capital transactions [intended] to achieve sound tax planning for the
fund as a whole.350
The significance is that the language from Bank of New York is dicta, because
the case was decided by reference to the individual holdings. Moreover, it was the
first case (and perhaps the only New York case prior to this one) advancing the
total portfolio approach. On the other hand, the individual asset rule was well es-
tablished in New York. To give the two approaches equal weight is a sharp depar-
ture from prior cases.
The court then took up the well established rule in New York that there is no
absolute duty to diversify and a failure to do so is not imprudent.35 1 This rule had
an impressive list of New York authorities.3 52 The court rejected the rule in favor
of the following "fairer and more persuasive reading of the cases:'" 353
[A]lthough there is no absolute duty to diversify in all circumstances, and al-
though a failure to diversify will not automatically result in liability, neither is a
fiduciary automatically insulated from liability based on a "mere" failure to di-
versify where the lack of diversification itself presents an unreasonable risk to
the assets of the estate or trust.354
This sounds very much like a presumption that a lack of diversification must be
satisfactorily explained by the fiduciary. If so, it marks a clear departure from the
previous rule surcharging for diversity only in compelling cases. Moreover, it is
much closer to the Restatement (Third) rule.355
Lastly, the court noted that the Bank "never made a formal analysis of estate
assets, implemented any formalized investment plan, or established any invest-
ment goals for the benefit of either the income beneficiaries or the remainder-
men."35 6 Such an analysis is the basis of developing a plan under modem portfo-
lio theory.357 However, such a statement was absent from prior case law.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Appellate Divi-
sion.35 8 The court quoted Professor Scott as approving the court's consideration
of each asset in relation to the trust portfolio as a whole,3 5 9 which is exactly the
view of modem portfolio theory.360 The court then used this concept in support-
ing the surcharge:
350. Estate of Janes, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 976 (quoting In re Bank of New York, 323 N.E.2d 700
(N.Y. 1974)).
351. See Estate of Janes, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 977.
352. See id. (citing cases).
353. Id. at 978.
354. Id.
355. RIsTAAxEmEN, supra note 5, § 228.
356. Estate of Janes, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
357. See supra Section III.
358. Estate of Janes, 681 N.E.2d 332 (N.Y. 1997).
359. See i at 337.
360. See supra Section HI.
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A second deficiency in petitioner's elements of hazard list is that all of the factors
relied on by petitioner go to the propriety of an individual investment "exclu-
sively... as though it were in its own watertight compartment" which would
encourage a fiduciary to treat each investment as an isolated transaction rather
than "in its relation to the whole of the trust estate."... This ignores the market
reality that, with respect to some investment vehicles, concentration itself may
create or add to risk, and essentially takes lack of diversification out of the pru-
dent person equation altogether.
... Notably, there was proof that [the bank] (1) failed initially to undertake
a formal analysis of the estate and establish an investment plan consistent with
the testator's primary objectives; (2) failed to follow petitioner's own internal
trustee review protocol during the administration of the estate .... and (3) failed
to conduct more than routine reviews of the Kodak holdings in this estate, with-
out considering alternate investment choices, over a seven-year period of steady
decline in the value of the stock.361
The major focus of the opinion of the Court of Appeals is the relation of the
asset to the total portfolio and the failure of the executor to develop, implement,
and monitor an investment plan for the estate. The opinion is consistent with the
Restatement and modem portfolio theory and represents a sharp departure from
prior analysis. Although the case does not explicitly mention the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts and refers to the New York statute only in a footnote, 362 it ap-
pears unmistakable that the court was influenced by these sources. Although this
is only one case, it was decided by a most influential court. It is highly probable
that additional changes in analysis of the prudent person rule will be forthcoming.
VIII. THE SURVEY
A. The Design and Distribution of the Survey
The survey was designed to test whether a so-called "intermediate" statute,
which mandates evaluating a portfolio by looking at total return, but that neither
specifically validates every investment and technique nor spells out in detail the
tenets of modem portfolio theory, changed the practices and opinions on prohib-
ited investment techniques of corporate trustees. As the objective of the survey
differs to some extent from that of Longstreth's survey,3 63 some of the questions
in this survey were somewhat different, although some were similar. The contents
of the survey are shown in Appendix A. The survey was mailed to 239 banking
institutions in Iowa having trust functions from a list made available to the author
by The Iowa Trust Association. 364 Twelve institutions had either moved, had by
their own evaluation trust assets too small to be involved in the survey, or chose
361. Estate of Janes, 681 N.E.2d at 338-39 (citations omitted).
362. See id. at 336 n.*.
363. See LONGsTRErH, supra note 4, Appendix C.
364. The Author again conveys his gratitude to The Iowa Trust Association and to J. Michael
Deege, its Executive Director, for their cooperation in the distribution of the survey and encour-
aging the members of the organization to respond. Without this aid, the survey could not have
been conducted.
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not to participate. Of the remaining 227 trust companies, responses were received
from sixty-one, a 26.8 percent rate. Given the rural nature, small size, and rela-
tively few personnel of many of the institutions involved, theAuthor considers this
an excellent response and a valid response on which to draw conclusions.365
One point should be noted about the survey. Two trust companies having
several branches throughout Iowa combined their responses and submitted one
survey covering all their branches. 366 Other trust companies allowed each branch
to send a separate response. The Author, after much consideration, decided to
count the combined responses as separate banks on the ground that failure to do so
would underweigh the combined responses in comparison to those trust compa-
nies which allowed each branch to send in a separate response. Thus, some cau-
tion should be used in viewing the statistics on this ground.
Second, a comparison with Bevis Longstreth's pioneering survey in 1985367
should be done cautiously. Mr. Longstreth surveyed the banks having the fifty
largest trust departments in the United States.368 This Author's survey covered
trust companies in Iowa. With one possible exception (and then only by combin-
ing its branches in several states), none of the trust companies in the Author's
survey would have been included in Mr. Longstreth's survey. Given the size of the
trusts held by the fifty largest bank trust departments, it is far more likely that
those trust departments would hold unusual types of assets and engage in the so-
phisticated techniques asked about in the surveys. Thus, one should be cautious in
comparing the surveys. Nevertheless, some conclusions of the effect of the "inter-
mediate statutes" can be stated.
B. Analysis of the Survey Results
The statistical results of the survey (in percentages) are given in Appendix B.
Overall, the results are not really surprising. In those areas of the survey ask-
ing about factors involving total return, the statute appears to have resulted in
improvement, in the sense that more trust departments have adopted modem theory
365. The Author thanks the personnel of those trust companies who responded for the time
and effort expended on the survey.
366. One such combined response covered eight banks; the other covered two banks.
367. LONGSanmI, supra note 4.
368. See id. at 5.
369. Recall that Iowa Code § 633.123, provides that in
making investment decisions, a fiduciary shall consider the role that the investment
plays within the account's portfolio of assets and may consider the general economic
conditions, the anticipated tax consequences of the investment, the anticipated dura-
tion of the account, and the needs of all beneficiaries of the account.
IowA CODE ANN. § 633.123(1) (,Vest 1992).
370. The methods reported in answer to question three by those corporate trustees stating that
they do not use risk-return analysis included the trustee's opinion, committee selection after
contacting other financial institutions in the area to compare rates, discussion with the grantor or
attorney for the trust to determine investment objectives and goals, work with the client, what
will best fit the client, use a conservative style of investment, and hold the assets with which the
grantor funds the trust.
371. These included investment desires of the beneficiaries, age and time horizon of the
beneficiaries, comfort of thebeneficiaries or grantor with certain types of assets, and how and to
whom the remainder was given.
372. Among the factors mentioned were economic conditions, inflation, concentration, risk
aversion and return expectations of beneficiaries, and market trends and projections. There is
some overlap between this category and the first category.
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in these areas. 3 69 This is particularly shown by the first two questions of the sur-
vey. Eighty-five percent of the respondents use the risk-return analysis mandated
by modem portfolio theory. Of those using the analysis, almost all take account of
the factors listed in question two (the income requirements and tax circumstances
of the beneficiaries and the need for and timing of distributions). If there is any
surprise, it is that fifteen percent of the respondents still do not use risk-return
analysis.3 70 In response to the question concerning other factors taken into ac-
count, the factors listed fell generally into three groups. Twenty-three percent
discussed beneficiaries' concerns, 37 1 forty percent cited investment characteris-
tics,37 2 (with twenty-three percent specifically mentioning risk tolerance), and
twenty-nine percent mentioned trust characteristics, with almost all of this cat-
egory (twenty-six percent) composed of length of the trust.
When attention is turned to whether the respondents believe that the Iowa
prudent person rule prohibits certain investments or techniques, the findings be-
came more problematic. First, only one-quarter of the respondents believed that
the prudent person rule prohibited taking advantage of investment opportunities
they would otherwise pursue.373 The most often mentioned was use of small-cap
stocks in an overall portfolio, mentioned by more than half of those answering yes
to the question.
In a most interesting answer, seventy-two percent of the respondents said they
held non-dividend paying stocks in their trust portfolios, a clear indication that
most respondents had few qualms about the prudent person rule permitting these
investments. 374
When discussing specific assets and techniques, to get a true picture one must
combine the answers to questions four, six, eight, and ten. Combining the answers
yields the following conclusions: Although three-quarters of the respondents do
not believe they are prevented by the prudent person rule from pursuing opportu-
nities they believe appropriate (question four), a major reason for this is that most
do not invest at all in many of the types of assets listed in question six or, if they
hold such assets, it is in a very small percentage of the trusts they manage. More-
over, the trustees holding these assets often have specific authorization in the trust
instrument to hold these assets (question eight), which, according to the written
comments, gives the trustee protection from liability for poor performance. The
respondents also give heavy weight to the grantor's intentions as to asset types
expressed in the instrument. Moreover, a significant segment of those answering
"no" to question six held only "safe" investments, e.g., mutual funds, domestic
fixed income investments, mortgages and real estate, for which they believe no
373. See Question 4, Appendix B. It might be noted that of the 25 percent answering yes,
two-thirds said this happened often. However, it should also be noted that in Longstreth's sur-
vey, while no respondent said the rule often prohibited investment opportunities, 63 percent of
respondents said it did "sometimes." LONGS'RMH, supra note 4, at 247.
374. See Question 5, Appendix B. This represents an advance over Longstreth's survey.
Longstreth reports that one of the investments most frequently mentioned as precluded under
the prudent man rule by bank trust departments was non-dividend paying stocks. See LoNGSa'Sm ,
supra note 4, at 234. One respondent who answered yes to this question stated these holdings
were typically through mutual funds. If this is true (though not stated) for other respondents, the
advance evidenced by the response to this question is somewhat tempered. Those answering no
to this question generally cited the need for current income, although one respondent considered
such stocks imprudent.
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governing instrument permission is necessary. Moreover, as discussed below,
"riskier" assets are usually held in a fairly small number of trusts in those trust
companies holding these assets. In short, the picture that emerges is that most
respondents hold very few "risky" assets, do not practice "risky" techniques, usu-
ally have specific authority in the governing instruments to hold the "risky" assets
they do hold, and do not consider the prudent person rule an impediment to taking
advantage of investment opportunities in the assets and techniques listed in ques-
tions six and ten. In general, these trustees consider such assets and techniques
inappropriate for personal trusts. If this is a correct interpretation of the data, the
one-quarter of the respondents answering "yes" to question four and the fifty-four
percent stating that some of the techniques listed in question ten are prohibited or
questionable indicate that the "intermediate" type of statute does not significantly
expand the types of assets or techniques trust officers believe are prudent.
As to assets held (question six), none of the respondents had trust assets in-
vested in options or commodity or non-commodity futures. Only two percent in-
vested in commodities (crops where the trust held farmland) and three percent in
venture capital (less than two percent of trusts at these institutions held venture
capital). On the other end of the scale, ninety-two percent of the respondents held
mutual funds and real estate, eighty-nine percent held domestic fixed income in-
vestments and seventy-one percent held preferred stock. The holdings for the lat-
ter group are not surprising, since these investments are generally safe from any
attack under the prudent person rule. More surprising was that fifty-six percent of
the respondents held index funds, 37 5 thirty-nine percent held foreign equities
376
and fifty-two percent held foreign mutual funds. 377 This indicates a commitment
to diversification consistent with modern portfolio theory. The percentage of re-
spondents holding gold and gold stocks was larger than anticipated, although a
very small percentage of trusts held these assets.378 Not only was the fact that
thirty-nine percent of the respondents held real estate investment trusts (REITs)
higher than expected, the percentage of trusts holding REITs in those institutions
was significant. 37 9 Given Iowa's investment in agriculture, the number of respon-
dents holding real estate and mortgages is easy to understand.3 80
Given these results, the response to the other part of question six, asking if the
Iowa prudent person rule prohibits investment in any of the assets, offers signifi-
cant food for thought. Forty-one percent of the respondents believed at least some
375. This is a significantly higher percentage than reported by the Longstreth survey (33
percent). See LONGsTRMr supra note 4, at 249. However, the percentage of trusts holding
index funds was usually small, almost always below 15 percent.
376. The number of trusts holding foreign equities, as in the case of index funds, was gener-
ally small (usually below five percent), although two respondents said 20 percent of their trusts
held foreign equities and one stated 50 percent of its funds held them.
377. The percentage of funds holding foreign mutual funds was a bit greater than index funds
or foreign equities, with 10 respondents reporting over 10 percent of their funds held these. two
of which reported 50 percent holding foreign mutual funds.
378. Most respondents reported that less than one percent of their trusts held either gold or
gold stocks.
379. While many reported less than one percent of the trusts held REITs, one respondent
reported 71 percent of its trusts held REITs, another reported 45 percent and another20 percent.
380. The percentages of trusts holding real estate is interesting. Seventy-two percent of
respondents reporting trusts holding real estate and reporting the percentage of their trusts hold-
ing it, reported that 10 percent or more of the trusts they managed held the asset.
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of the investments were prohibited, while thirty-one percent said none were pro-
hibited. Options (thirty-four percent), commodity futures (thirty-three percent),
and commodities and non-commodity futures (thirty percent) were the most men-
tioned.
At first glance, question seven appears to say that enactment of the UPIA will
make little difference in the practice of trust investing in Iowa. This may in fact be
true because, as mentioned above, a significant number of trust companies hold
few if any questionable assets, generally have specific authority for these invest-
ments in the trusts that contain them, and frankly think "riskier" investments are
inappropriate to their trusts. If this view is not influenced by the prudent person
rule, a change in the law will not make a significant difference in their investing
practices. However, for the more than one-fifth of the respondents who answered
"more likely," the change will be significant. Respondents giving this answer
liked the specificity and more complete language of the UPIA and the allowance
and encouragement of a greater degree of diversification.
Perhaps the greatest limit of the prudent person rule is revealed in question
ten. More than half of the respondents believe some or all of these techniques are
prohibited by the rule, with naked puts and calls, margin purchases, short selling
and straddles mentioned as prohibited or questionable by more than forty percent
of those responding. One respondent commented that the UPIA is more permis-
sive of such techniques, although the respondent would consider many of these
techniques inappropriate for personal trusts it manages under any version of a "pru-
dent man" or "prudent investor" statute.
The last question was inserted to obtain information concerning delegation of
investment powers, which is permitted by the UPIA.381 The percentage already
delegating (approximately one-third of those responding) is fairly high. However,
it should be taken cautiously. Two respondents specifically stated that their re-
sponse was based on defining investing in mutual funds as being a delegation. 382
Others may have also answered "yes" to this question based on investment in mu-
tual funds without specifically so stating. Because the question was intended to
determine whether the trustee actually delegated the choosing of investments to an
outside manager beyond investing in mutual funds, and the question was appar-
ently to some extent ambiguous, care should be used in drawing any conclusions
from this question.
C. Conclusion
The survey results appear to confirm that "intermediate" statutes (such as Iowa's
statute), mandating that investment performance be evaluated by looking at the
investments in relation to their impact on the total portfolio, has encouraged cor-
porate trustees in some areas. Most report they use a risk-return analysis and ap-
pear to generally consider the factors mentioned by the Restatement and the UPIA.
A surprising number of corporate trustees hold "non-traditional" assets, including
assets that some might have formerly labeled "questionable" or "imprudent," in at
least some of the trusts they manage. Also, many of the respondents hold stocks
381. UPIA, supra note 6, at § 9.
382. These were counted as a "no" answer.
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which do not regularly pay a dividend in their trusts. Even if these holdings are in
mutual funds (a question not asked in the survey), this represents an advance to-
ward modem portfolio theory. On the other hand, approximately one-quarter of
the respondents feel constrained not to hold certain classes of assets and many
believe certain investment techniques are limited by the prudent person rule. And
a number of respondents mentioned the flexibility and specificity in the UPIA,
believing adoption of that act would allow the greater use of non-traditional assets
and techniques.
IX CONCLUSION
In the 1980s, writers began to realize that the prudent person rule then gener-
ally in force in the United States was preventing trust assets from being invested in
the manner modem economic theory predicted would maximize the return on these
assets. Modem portfolio theory, which by then had been developing for more than
thirty years, focused on a risk-return analysis for each portfolio. It taught that the
proper focus was on the portfolio as a whole and the role that each investment
played in the overall portfolio, emphasized the role that diversification played in
reducing uncompensated risk, and revealed that because of the differing role that
each asset or technique could play in a portfolio, no asset or technique should be
prohibited. These developments led to the passage of "intermediate" statutes by a
number of states, altering the focus of any inquiry into a trustee's investment per-
formance from the individual asset to the total portfolio and the role of the ques-
tioned asset in the portfolio.
Beginning in 1989, the American Law Institute undertook a major examina-
tion into trust investing which resulted in the reformation of the prudent man rule.
The formulation of the prudent investor rule in the Restatement (7Tird) of Trtsts
and the later promulgation of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA) adopted
modem economic theory as the basis of trust investing and proposed a major alter-
ation in the development of a trust portfolio.
In an attempt to determine the effect of the "intermediate" statutes, the Author
undertook to survey Iowa trust companies on their investment practices. The sur-
vey revealed some movement toward adopting the practices of modem portfolio
theory under an "intermediate" statute, but also the feeling that even such statutes
do not remove major impediments to investing in a manner consistent with mod-
em theory. The data also lead to an inference that many respondents believe that
trusts should be invested quite conservatively and the importance of the income
needs of a trust would render certain asset classes and techniques inappropriate to
trust investing, even under the UPIA. This inference, if true, would indicate that
while adoption of the UPIA would result in some change in trust investments,
many if not most trusts would not alter their investment structure greatly.3 83 The
question of whether such a philosophy is correct remains for future experience and
research.
383. This is also the view of at least one commentator who did not believe the Restatement
would have a major impact due to the need for income and the purposes of most trusts. Welch,
supra note 237, at 20-21. The commentator believed the greatest impact of the adoption of the
prudent investor rule would be on larger trusts and professional trustees, which would become
more growth oriented and choose somewhat less conservative investments. See id.
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The survey also clearly revealed that even under an "intermediate" statute, a
significant percentage of trust companies believe there are investment opportuni-
ties prohibited by the prudent person rule which they could use to their advantage
in trusts they manage. Moreover, these respondents believe the UPIA is much
more certain and permissive in allowing these assets and techniques. It would
appear that legislatures should be encouraged to adopt the UPIA or some version
of it to alleviate these concerns and spell out clearly that all classes of assets and
techniques are permitted if evaluated with care, skill, and caution.
Some commentators also believed that there would be great resistance to the
adoption of a prudent investor rule.3 84 In any event, the few cases decided under
the "intermediate" or modern statutes reveal that these statutes and modern portfo-
lio theory have already influenced the analysis of cases not expressly governed by
the statutes. It is likely that this trend will continue. It is also likely that as cases
arise in jurisdictions adopting the UPIA, the basis of determining a trustee's liabil-
ity for improper investments will undergo fundamental changes. Adoption of the
UPIA and the principles of the Restatement will remove the impediments to in-
vestment opportunities caused by the old prudent person rule. It will also bring
trust investment law into conformity with modern investment theory. It will prob-
ably cause some alteration in the practices of trustees.38 5 Today's economic chal-
lenges require that trustees have the ability to invest freely and flexibly, recogniz-
ing the needs of both those holding the income interest and the remainder benefi-
ciaries. The "intermediate" statutes were a good first step, but more is now neces-
sary. The rules of the Restatement and the UPIA have the potential to bring trust
investment practices into the modern era. The prudent investor needs the specific-
ity and certainty of the UPIA and the Restatement.
384. See also Gordon, supra note 4, at 88-91; Johnson, supra note 86, at 421.
385. Though a discussion of these changes is beyond the scope of this article, a number of
commentators suggest that the documenting of decisions will greatly increase and more factors
may need consideration. See Welch, supra note 237, at 24-25; Taylor, supra note 249, at 62-63:
Herschberger, supra note 239, at 5-39. On other recommendations, see generally AItfcst, supra
note 68. The most extensive discussions of the potential changes of trust practices to date have
been written by John H. Langbein, the Reporter for the UPIA. See generally Langbein, supra
note 312, and Langbein, supra note 35.
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APPENDIX A
PERSONAL TRUST INVESTMENTS SURVEY
1. In determining the investments of personal trusts managed by your institution, do you
employ the risk-return alaysis suggested by modem portfolio theory?
Yes No___
2. If you answered "Yes" to question 1, do you take into account any of the following
factors (check all that apply)?
__ The income requirements of the beneficiaries.
__The tax circumstances of the beneficiaries.
_____The possible need for and timing of significant distributions from the
trust (for example, attendance of college by beneficiaries).
Other factors.
If "Other Factors" is checked, please briefly describe examples of such factors.
3. If you answered "No" to question 1, what process do you use to develop an investment
portfolio for your trust accounts?
4. Does the prudent person rule governing investments prohibit taking advantage of in-
vestment opportunities you would otherwise pursue in portfolios of personal trusts
(inter vivos or testamentary) managed by your institution? For your convenience,
sections 633.123 and 633.123A of the Iowa Code are attached to this survey as At-
tachment 1.
Yes No
If so, how often:
Often - Sometimes - Rarely
Please list the types of investments or investment techniques that you believe
are prohibited.
5. Do you hold in personal trusts managed by your institution any common stocks which
do not regularly pay a dividend?
Yes No___
If you answered no, why, in your opinion, do personal trusts managed by your
institution not own any such stocks?
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6. Please indicate whether any of the personal trusts of which your institution is trustee
contains any of the following and, if so, the percentage of trusts containing each asset:
Yes No Percentage
(a) Options
(b) Commodities
(c) Commodity Futures
(d) Non-Commodity Futures
(e) Mutual Funds (other than your
bank's common trust funds or
your bank's proprietary mutual funds).
(0 Venture Capital
(g) Index Funds
(h) Foreign Equities
(i) Foreign Mutual Funds
(j) Gold
(k) Gold Stocks
(1) Collectibles
(in) Domestic Fixed Income
Investments
(n) Foreign Fixed Income
Investments
(o) REITs
(p) Mortgages
(q) Real Estate
(r) Preferred Stocks
Do you believe that the prudent person rule in force in Iowa precludes investment of
personal trusts in any of the above? If so, please list the assets you believe are pre-
cluded.
7. Included with this survey as Attachment 2 is the Uniform Prudent Investor Act as
proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. If
this act was enacted by the state (or states) in which your institution does business,
would you be more likely, less likely, or equally likely to invest in the assets listed in
question 6 for the personal trusts managed by your institution.
More Likely - Less Likely Equally Likely
If you answered More Likely or Less Likely, which assets would you be more or less
likely to invest in under the Uniform Act?
Please briefly explain why you would be more or less likely to invest in these assets
under the Uniform Act.
8. With respect to any asset listed in question 6 to which you state ARE held in
personal trusts managed by your institution, did the governing trust instru-
ment or will specifically authorize the investment in the category isted?
Yes No
9. With respect to any asset listed in question 6 to which you state are NOT held
in personal trusts managed by your institution, would your answer change if
the governing trust instrument or will specifically authorized the investment
in the specific category listed?
Yes No
If "Yes," please explain briefly why your answer would change.
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10. Do you believe the prudent person rule precludes or renders questionable with regard
to personal trusts any investment techniques, such as short selling, margin purchases,
hedging, market timing, arbitrage, covered calls, puts, naked puts and calls, or straddles?
Yes No_ __
If you answered "Yes," please state which techniques are rendered questionable or are
prohibited.
Technique Ouestionable
11. Do you delegate investment authority to any outside managers?
12. Please state the amount of managed assets of personal trusts managed by your institu-
tion.
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APPENDIX B
PERSONAL TRUST INVESTMENTS SURVEY
ALL FIGURES ARE PERCENTAGES3 86
In determining the investments of personal trusts managed by your institution, do
you employ the risk-return analysis suggested by modem portfolio theory?
Yes 85 No15
2. If you answered "Yes" to question 1, do you take into account any of the following
factors (check all that apply)?
100 The income requirements of the beneficiaries.
98 The tax circumstances of the beneficiaries.
100 The possible need for and timing of significant distributions frpm the trust
(for example, attendance of college by beneficiaries).
Other factors.
If "Other Factors" is checked, please briefly describe examples of such factors.
3. If you answered "No" to question 1, what process do you use to develop an investment
portfolio for your trust accounts?
4. Does the prudent person rule governing investments prohibit taking advantage of in-
vestment opportunities you would otherwise pursue in portfolios of personal trusts
(inter vivos or testamentary) managed by your institution? For your convenience,
sections 633.123 and 633.123A of the Iowa Code are attached to this survey as At-
tachment 1.
Yes 25 No 75
If so, how often:
Often 67% Sometimes 27% Rarely 7%
Please list the types of investments or investment techniques that you believe are pro-
hibited.
5. Do you hold in personal trusts managed by your institution any common stocks which
do not regularly pay a dividend?
Yes 72% No 28%
If you answered no, why, in your opinion, do personal trusts managed by your institu-
tion not own any such stocks?
386. In some questions, the answers add to more or less than 100 percent due to rounding.
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Options
Commodities
Commodity Futures
Non-Commodity Futures
Mutual Funds (other than
your bank's common trust
funds or your bank's
proprietary mutual funds).
Venture Capital
Index Funds
Foreign Equities
Foreign Mutual Funds
Gold
Gold Stocks
Collectibles
Domestic Fixed Income
Investments
Foreign Fixed Income
Investments
REITs
Mortgages
Real Estate
Preferred Stocks
89 11
Do you believe that the prudent person rule in force in Iowa precludes investment of
personal trusts in any of the above? If so, please list the assets you believe are pre-
cluded.
Options
Commodities
Commodity Futures
Non-Commodity Futures
Mutual Funds
Venture Capital
Index Funds
Foreign Equities
Foreign Mutual Funds
Gold
Gold Stocks
Collectibles
Domestic Fixed Income Investments
Foreign Fixed Income Investments
REITs
Mortgages
Real Estate
Preferred Stock
Percentage Believing
Investment Precluded By
Iowa's Prudent Person Rule
34
30
33
30
0
26
3
16
15
23
15
26
0
15
3
2
2
0
Please indicate whether any of the personal trusts of which your institution is trustee
contains any of the following and, if so, the percentage of trusts containing each asset
(in percentages):
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Respondents Saying Some of 41%
Assets Listed Are Prohibited
By Prudent Man Rule
Respondents Saying None of 31%
Assets Listed Are Prohibited
By Prudent Man Rule
Respondents Not Sure 2%
Respondents Not Answering 26%
Question
7. Included with this survey as Attachment 2 is the Uniform Prudent Investor Act as
proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. If
this act was enacted by the state (or states) in which your institution does business,
would you be more likely, less likely, or equally likely to invest in the assets listed in
question 6 for the personal trusts managed by your institution?
More Likely 21 Less Likely 0
Equally Likely 22 No Answer 3
If you answered "More Likely" or "Less Likely," which assets would you be more or
less likely to invest in under the Uniform Act?
Please briefly explain why you would be more or less likely to invest in these assets
under the Uniform Act.
8. With respect to any asset listed in question 6 to which you statedARE held in personal
trusts managed by your institution, did the governing trust instrument or will specifi-
cally authorize the investment in the category listed?
Yes 54 No 43 Some3
9. With respect to any asset listed in question 6 to which you stated are =OT held in
personal trusts managed by your institution, would your answer change if the govern-
ing trust instrument or will specifically authorized the investment in the specific cat-
egory listed?
Yes J No 80 No Answer 2
If "Yes," please explain briefly why your answer would change.
10. Do you believe the prudent person rule precludes or renders questionable with regard
to personal trusts any investment techniques, such as short selling, margin purchases,
hedging, market timing, arbitrage, covered calls, puts, naked puts and calls, or straddles?
Yes 54 No 41 No Answer or Don't Know 5
If you answered "Yes," please state which techniques are rendered questionable or are
prohibited.
[Vol. 5 1:1
86 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1
.... J
11 A
THE UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT
Technique
Short Selling
Margin Purchases
Hedging
Market Timing
Arbitrage
Covered Calls
Puts
Naked Puts and Calls
Straddles
Prohibited
All Answers
24
36
15
11
18
15
15
38
18
Yes Answers
44
67
26
21
32
26
26
70
32
Ouestionable
AIlAnswers Yes Answers
18 33
10 18
20 36
23 42
5 9
11 21
11 21
8 15
23 42
11. Do you delegate investment authority to any outside managers?
Yes 31 No 69
12. Please state the amount of managed assets of personal trusts managed by
your institution.
$
1999]
